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lo INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
This paper has a dual origin in ( i ) some emprical studies of technological 
change in Latin American steelplants carried out by the BID/CEPAL Technology 
Research Programme (see Maxwell 1976 V , Dahlman £ Valadares, 1978 ^Z, and 
Perez Aceves £ Perez y Peniche, 1978 ^Z, and ( i i ) a theoretical and review paper 
by Teubal, 1978 also written for the BID/CEPAL Programme, in which one of the 
aspects proposed is a model of output increasing innovations. 
The topic drawn from both sources, and developed in preliminary form in the 
present paper, is the nature and significance of "capacity stretching" in 
industrial plants. 
This term refers to processes through which the production capacity of 
plants is increased in small, incremental steps, without the requirement for 
large new investment or replacement programmes. Certainly, some replacement 
investment or complementary investment may be involved. However, most of the 
plant and its equipment is l e f t recognisably the same as before, and no thorough-
going revamp is executed. Yet the result is an incremental boost in capacity. 
If many such incremental steps occur, intermittengly of continuously, one can 
speak fo the "stretching" of a plant's capacity over time. 
Empirically, it appears from the steelplant studies mentiones above, and 
from several empirical studies in the BID/CEPAL series, dealing with firms in 
other industries -see J. Katz etc, al . 1977 ^/j Perez and Perez 1978 £/, 
F. Sercovich JJ^ J. Fidel and J. Lucangeli that capacity stretching is 
quite a widespread phenomenon in Latin American industrial plants. There is 
also some evidence in the industrial-economics literature from developed countries 
to suggest that plant capacity-stretching may be common in advanced economies 
too. £/ 
Nevertheless one has to search hard in order to "piece together" from 
economics literature a systematic empirical description or theoretical 
articulation of capacity-stretching. Most standard economics text treatments 
of the production plan of the firm do not mention it at a l l . 
This does not mean the phenomenon has passed un-noticed by economists. 
For example, important theoretical as well as empirical aspects of capacity 
stretching have been signalled by authors such as Enos 10/, Hollander 11/, 
Chenery 12/, Andrews 13/, Hughes lA/, Levin and Sercovich 16/ 
(the latter in the BID/CEPAL Programme), and undoubtedly there are many other 
contributions which could be found by a systematic literature search. 
However, it is obvious that most "theory of the firm" literature and 
"technical change analytics" literature uses the notion of plants that have 
a fixed capacity. A notable example comes from Salter's well known analysis 
of technical change, where i t is assumed that "once a plant is constructed, 
no changes occur in the input of factors of production required to produce 
the original designed 'normal capacity output' . . . and that to reduce the 
quantities of labour, materials and fuel needed to produce a given output 
requires a different technique, and this is only possible with a new outfit 
•of capital equipment" 17/. Later on in his analysis Salter points out that 
the assumption of an " inf lexible technique embodied in ah indivisible plant" is 
unrealistic and he discusses the piecemeal modernization of plants via replacement 
of individual machines in them. 18/ But even with this important addition to 
his analysis, Salter's plant s t i l l always operate at unchanged 'normal capacity 
output'. Although variable production costs are assumed to f a l l at the plant due 
to piecemeal replacementsj capacity is assumed to remain the same. 
A second reason why the subject of capacity-stretching seems to be somewhat 
"lost from view" in the economic literature is that even when stretchin is 
explicitly recognised it is usually viewed as merely a mechanis for achieving 
cost-reductions via increases in scale of output rather than as a pehnomenon or 
objective in its own right. A good example of this comes from the celebrated 
empirical study of technical change in rayon plants by S. Hollander in which 
attention was explicitly restricted to technical changes aimed at producing 
reduction in the unit cost of rayon, and in which capacity^stretching technical 
changes were termed "indirect,, cost-reducing technical changes". 19/ 
A third reason which can be tentatively suggested to explain the relative 
lack of literature on capacity-stretching is that economic analysis has tended 
to concentrate on- either the "short-run" adjustment of the firm to changing 
factor or product prices (when machinery and technique is assximed unalterable) 
or on the "long-run" adjustment of the firm when, in principle, enterpreneurs 
are free to adjust not only their variable factors but also a l l their fixed 
factors of production as well in search of the least cost way of producing 
their planned long-run output. For instance standard expositions of the 
'production plan' in'microeconomics texts nearly always show both short-run 
and long-run average cost and marginal cost curves. But they do not usually 
show "medium rim curves', which loosely speaking refer to a l l those intermediate 
situations in which the entrepreneur may undertake some alterations or 
additions to his existing capital sotck and organization, but when he i s ' s t i l l 
greatly constrained by those elements within this stock or organization which, 
by their inherent nature, are the most di f f ic i i l t to alter quickly - i . e . that 
are.the most " f ixed". It is our be l ie f , advanced in the paper, that capacity 
stretching f a l l s within the broad category of "medium-run adjustments" in 
industrial plants- and possibly because this category is so broad and does 
not admit of such precise delineation as the short-run and long-run equilibrium 
situations, i t has not been that much explored. 
Now for the specific aims.and scope of the present paper: to start with, 
in Section 2 that follows, some brief remarks are made on the definitions of 
production capacity and. capacity stretching -the aim being to explain pur u.se 
of these concepts-, then, in Part I on 'Empirical Findings' the aim is to pull 
together and synthesize the various empirical results on capacity stretching 
reached in the BID/CEPAL steelplant case-studies. In particular. Sections 3 to 
7 in Part I deal with the extent, frequency, and causes of the capacity-stretching 
projects observed in the plants, as well as the methods used to bring capacity-
stretching about. Section 8 summarises these empirical findings. 
In Part I I , 'Interpretation and Models' the aim is to provide some 
articulation of these findings. In particular. Section 9 explains how four 
prominent technological characteristics of steel plants provide frequent 
stimuli to capacity stretching projects. Section 10 portrays capacity-stretching 
as a medium-run adjustment by firms to a. demand increase, constrating it with 
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both short-rua and long-rim adjustments. Section 11 contrasts capacity-stretching 
to "pure" cost-reducing technical changes. Section 12 develops a model which 
illustrates several parameters involved in the rtaking of an optimal choice by 
firms as between stretching the capacity of i ts plant or conventional expansion 
when faced by an increase in demand. 
A point we wish to emphasize is that this is wry snich a working paper. 
It is an assembly of "results so far" whose main purpose is to act as a way-stage 
contribution towards a more developed and refined treateent of the capacity 
stretching theme. 
For this reason, at the end of our summary of the p)aper in Section 13, we 
brief ly note some lines of further development which we believe would be worth 
exploring in order to develop the topic more adequately. Quite piKjbable some, 
i f not a l l , of these further lines have already received some investigative 
effort and had results published in the literature. In that sense we hope this 
paper wil l stimulate readers and future authors ioterested in this theme to 
"unbury" from the literature the many contributions realting to capacity-stretching 
which we believe are there, expressed in the vocabulary of ' f i r® expansion paths', 
'economies of scale ' , 'latent economies of scale ' , 'cost-reducing technical 
changes', ' p l ^ t upgrading and modemizatioii'^ 'incremental teclmical change', 
and so on. 
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11/ S. Hollander, The Sources of Increased Efficiency, MIT Press, 1965. 
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to denote what Gold calls "practically sustainable capacity at present". Moreover 
Sercovich underlines the distinction between the "nominal capacity" of a plant 
and its "effective capacity". 
Nominal capacity is the capacity that was contracted for by the owner 
upon purchasing the plant. It does not alter throughout the plant's lifetime 
except in the case, of major new investments in the. plant or replacements in its 
main process units, in which case the plant is considered to have "changed 
its identity" (i.e. become a different plant). 
Effective capacity, on the other hand, can and.usually does vary throvighout 
the life of a plant: thus, during the "start-up" period of plants, effective 
capacity usually begins well below nominal capacity (see Baloff 1963 3/), and 
it is the main purpose during start-ups for a plant personnel to leam how to 
gradually speed up the process and improve their own capability in handling it 
so that its effective capacity will reach its nominal capacity. 
But even when the start-up process is finiches (and a "steady-state" 
effective capacity is approximated) this may not last long, because effective 
capacity is liable to important fluctuations and systematic variations in both 
a downwards and an upwards direction under the impact of changed processing 
conditions. 
Given this variability through time of effective capacity, one interesting 
theme not taken up in this paper - concerns the circumstances in which 
effective plant.capacity, after startup, may lie below nominal capacity. (See 
Sercovich's treatment of this topic , and also Eckhaus 
Our theme, in contrast, concerns the way that higher-than-nominal capacities 
may result from engineering and learning efforts made in plants after their 
start-up period is over, b/ 
In fact we shall focus on the cumulative impact of such engineering ana 
learning efforts in leading to what we call the "stretching" of plant 
capacities" (i.e. of effective' capacities) over time - as well as enquiring 
into the determinants of these engineerinp; and learning efforts. 
a/ Nominal capacity is frequently referred to as "rated capacity", or 
"design capacity". In this paper, all three terms are considered to have 
identical meaning, and the- term nominal capacity will be used. 
b/ It can happen that nominal capacity gets rated "conservatively" by 
the supplier upon delivering the completed plant so that output at the end of 
the start up period, and in normal working conditions, already exceeds the 
contractually promised levels without post-start-up engineering effort having 
been put in. However we shall not be exploring the empirical incidence of 
this in the present paper, and will usually assimie that effective capacity 
at the end of the start up period corresponds fairly closely to nominal 
capacity - so that si±)sequent increases in effective capacity can then be 
atributed largely to post-start-up engineering efforts at the plant itself 
which result in disembodied technical changes in the plant or in embodied 
technical changes implying only low levels of additional capital investment. 
In our empirical accoiint that follows 5 which is based on evidence from 
several latin American steelplants, we shall regard as evidence of "stretched" 
capacity the achievement of higher than nominal capacity levels from plants, or 
from particular eqiiipment vmits within plants, provided that these higher levels 
were not secured as a res\ilt of substantial new investment in the units or plants 
concerned. 
But what constitutes "sxibstantial" new investment? A convention could be 
adopted that the sum total of new investments made to modi:fy a unit should not 
exceed X% of the original capital equipment invested in it. However we prefer 
to leave the matter less sharply defined that this, and will usually interpret 
all changes that do not actually replace or add main process units in our 
steelplants as "minor" changes which in turn can be considered to involve only 
minor, not siAstantial new investment. £/ 
So much, then, for the preliminaries. We now turn to look at some of the 
empirical research findings. 
£/ Sercovich's criterion is similar to ours thouth its wording seems to 
limit the size of the investments rather more strictly. Thus for Sercovich, 
the concept of effective capacity admits "the contribution of all those plant 
engineering efforts which have borne fruit up to the time when the calculation 
is made", and includes "those limited complementary investments which are 
linked with plant engineering efforts". On the other hand, the concept of 
increased effective capacity does not include changes of capacity "due to 
significant additional investments in fixed assets made after the start up of 
the plant". 6/ 
Noté to Sections 3 to 8 
In Sections 3 to 8 we often refer in footnotes to the case studies. These 
are denominated as follows: 
i 
Acindar, Rosario Report, (1976) = Philip Maxwell, 'Learning and Technical 
Change in, the Steelplant of Acindar S.A. in Rosario, Argentina7 BID/CEPAL BA 
18, December 1976. 
Acindar, Rosario Report (1978 Version) = Philip Maxwell, First-best 
Technological Strategy in an "Nth-best" Economic Context, BID/CEPAL BA 26, 
April 1978. ^ 
Acindar Report (Draft Thesis Version) = Philip Maxwell, "Learning and 
Technology Policy in Developing Countries A Case Study based on the Experience 
of the Argentine Steel Firm, Acindar S.A. 19U3-1978", Draft D. Phil Thesis, 
Buenos Aires 1980. 
USIMINAS Report = C. Dahlman and F. Valadares Fonseca, From Technological 
Dependence to Technological Development: The Case of the USIMINAS Steelplant 
in Bfaail, Vols I and II, Working Paper 21, BID/CEPAL/PNUD, October 1978. 
Colombia Steel Industry Report = G. Puerta, El Desarrollo Tecnológico en 
lá Industria Sidéjíúrgica en Colombia, (Technological Development in the Colombian 
Steel Industry), Working Paper 26, BID/CEPAL/PNUD, April 1979, Spanish. 
AHMSA Report = L.A. Pérez Aceves S J. Pérez y Peniche, Decisiones Tecnolígicas 
al Nivel de Empresa. El Caso de Altos Hornos de México S.A., (Technological 
Decisions at the Firm-Level. The Case of Altos Hornos de Mexico S.A.), Working 
Paper 2i+, BID/CEPAL/PNUD, October 1978, Spanish. 
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EXTENT OF CAPACITY-STRETCHING OBSERVED IN STEELPLANTS 
One of the main findings reported in the series of BID/CEPAL Steelplant 
studies concerns the extent to which the effective capacity of many of the 
existing installations in the sample of plants was "stretched" -often far 
beyond nominal capacity- as a result of experience gained in operating these 
installations and the technical changes introduced in them. 
To illustrate this finding, we collect in Table 1 below some figures on 
the extent of capacity stretching observed in the USIMINAS^ Acindar, AHMSA 
and Acerías Paz del Rio plants in different kinds of steelmaking units within 
these plants-
The feature which clearly emerges is the great extent to which the 
effective capacity of the units shown in the table was stretched beyond nominal 
capacity. These increases ranged from effective capacity reaching 25% above 
nominal capacity to reaching over 130% above nominal capacity a impressive 
by any standards. 
The 'novelty' of these results is not in their documentation of the 
existence of capacity-stretching. For example, years ago both Enos (1958) 1/ 
and Hollander (1955) 2_/ drew attention to the output increases, that could be 
obtained from largely unchanged plants in the fields of petrochemical and rayon 
plants respectively. Rather¿ if there is novelty in the results, it lies in 
the great quantitative significance that capacity-stretching seems to have had 
in these particular steelplants that were examined in different Latin American 
countries. 
Interestingly 5 there is rather little written in the large economics 
literature on the steel industry about this capacity-stretching phenomenon, 
even in the literature dealing with economies of scale. V One of the 
exceptions to this rule is Rosegger (1975) who noted that 
"An additional element of expansion was provided by the frequently 
remarkable increases in the rated capacities of existing plants 
through accumulation of smaller technological improvements and through 
"leaming-by-doing". Dp-ratings of ten to fifteen percent over a 
five year span are not unusual. They constitute another variable in 
a more dynamic view- of the determination of plant sizes and the 
achievement of targeted final outputs, further modifying the concept 
of optimal capacities"..............."If the history of iron and 
steel-works in developed countries is any guide, continuous technolog-
ical changes and the concomitant creation of incremental capacities 
at individual stages can be regarded as the rule rather than the 
exception" 
The results obtained in the sample of Latin American plants strongly 
support these views of Rosegger's. But whereas he talks of upratings of up to 
fifteen percent over a five-year time-span, we have here got cases where much 
larger percentage increases in effective capacity were obtained, for example 
up to 130% over a six to seven year time-span in the case of USIMINAS's first 
two blast furnaces and first steel shop, and 66% to 130% in Acindar's 
steelmaking and rolling units over periods ranging from 7 to 29 years. 
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Table 3.1 Extent of capacity stretching observed in different plants and types of equipment 
I 
-P 
Type of Equipment Plant and Units Time Period 
Nominal capacity of 
the Units at Begin-
ning of Period 
Efective Capacity 




Sinter strands USIHINAS 
Original sinter plant 1967-73 770 000 tons/yearo/ 1 544 000 tons/yéai-^'' 101% 
Coke ovens USIHINAS 
Original coke planta 1970-73 507 000 tons/year^'' 634 233 tons/year^'' 25% 
Blast furnaces USIMINAS 
Furnaces 1 and 2 1966-73 501Í 000 tons/year^'' 1 196 603 tons/year^'' 137% 
ACERIAS PAZ DEL RIO 
Original furnace 1955-57 500 tons/day 840 tons/day 68% 
Steel shops ACrfiDAR (Rosarlo) 
tons/houi^'' Siemens-Hartin No.l 191(4-73 2.75 6.32 tons/hour 130% 
Siemens Martin No.2 191)9-73 3.65 tons/hour^'' 6.32 tons/hour 72% 
Siemens Martin No.3 19614-73 3.80 tons/houtfe-^ 6.32 tons/hour 86% 
ATOiSA 
tons/day-d^ Siemens-Martin No.l to 3 1963-73 227 tons/day-^'' 410 Sl% 
Siemens-Martin No.4 to 8 , •;1963-72 393 e/ tons/day- 607 tons/day^'' 54% 
USIMINAS 
BOF shop No.l 1966-72 500 000 tons /year^^ 1 179 000 tons/year^'' 134% 
Rolling Hills ACINDAR (Rosario) 
c/ tons/hour— Billet Hill 1955-74 8.30 19.00 tons/hour 129% 
Bar 6 Section Mill 1955-71 9.90 tons/houi¿-^ 17.20 tons/hour 74% 
Source: Derived from data in Acindar Repcirt (1976), Usiminas Report, AHHSA Report and Colombia Steel Industry Report. 
a_/ These figures all refer to the nominal capacity of the units concerned. In every case this nominal capacity vras 
actually achieved in the year shown at the beginning of the time-period, (i.e. the start-up period leading to the achievement 
of nominal capacity is excluded from the figures in the table). 
b/ These figures all refer to the viorkirig capacity of the units aftef completion of their start-up period and refer to 
their capacity in use (i.e. when not "down" for maintenance or repairs). 
o/ Ditto as for 2/ except that capacity is expressed in tons, per shift hour. 
¿/ Average per furnace for the three furnaces. 
e/ Average per furnace for the five furnaces. 
A central feature of all the cases of "capacity-stretching" that were 
observed 3 was that it was brought about mainly by the introduction and accumulation 
of minor, incremental technical changes to the existing equipment. Furthermore, 
this piecemeal, incremental capacity-stretching was usually brough about at 
relatively low investment cost compared to the investment in the original 
installations3 ensuring that the investment costs per unit of extra (stretched) 
capacity were far below the investment cost per unit of nominal (unstretched) 
capacity. 
As to the sources of the incremental technical changes introduced, these 
involved in all cases a combination of (i) carrying out changes suggested by 
the plant's actual experience in operating the units concerned, i.e. "leaming-
by-doing, and (ii) copying technical changes and improvements adopted elsewhere 
on similar equipment after suitably specifying and adapting them to the 
idiosyncratic local equipment and conditions in the plant concerned. 
In any event the sheer cumiilative extent and consequent economic significance 
of the capacity-stretching observed in this sample of plants justify an effort 
to look more closely into the factors which led to it. 
a/ Between 1957-68 and 1976-77, approximately US$ 7 million was invested 
by Acindar in its Rosario plant (the one mentioned in the table) compared to 
$22 million in its "Acevedo" plant and $27 million in its "Marathon" plant. The 
Investments in capacity-stretching projects in the Rosario plant were considerably 
less tahn $7 million, and appear to have accounted for less than half this total. 
Source of Data: Acindar Project Investment Approvals Archive. 
In USIMINAS, the costs of "capacity-stretching" expansion from 500,000 tons 
nominal capacity to 1,200,000 tons was roughly estimated to have cost only 
US $ 40 millions compared to $ 261 millions in the original plant: see USIMINAS 
Report, Vol. 1, p. 186. Moreover, much of this $ 40 million involved technical 
assistance contracts and "what little investment occured was in small peripheral 
equipment such as sintering screens, roll crushers minor modification in major 
equipment units etc. "See USIMINAS Report, Vol. 1 p. 259. 
In AHMSA, investments in the Siemens Martin steelshop after 1967 were minimal 
due to the priority given by the enterprise to investments in the forthcoming 
new EOF shop: see account in Section 4.3 below. 
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4. EVIDENCE ON THE "PERVASIVENESS" OF CAPACITY-STRETCHING 
TECHNICAL CHANGE IN STEELPLANTS 
A second finding from the case-studies is that capacity-stretching projects 
were 'pervasive". 
By 'pervasive' what we mean is that (a) in each of the plants at any 
moment there were always an appreciable number of technical projects leading to 
stretched capacity going on in at least one production stage and often in two or 
three stages of the plant at the same time; (b) these projects usually represented 
a very significant fraction of the overall sett of technical change projects being 
undertaken in the plants at any particular time. 
Moreover this 'pervasive' nature of capacity-stretching seems related to 
the observation that besides being frequently a priority objective of technical 
change in its own right, capacity-stretching was also noticed to have frequently 
occurred as a secondary objective, necessary condition or spin-off benefit of 
technical changes introduced with other main objectives in view (e.g. reducing 
unit costs, raising product quality, varying input-mix, etc.) 
Some detailed evidence in support of these observations comes from the 
Acindar case-study where two samples of technical projects were examined to see 
what objectives motivated them: 
i. A sampel of 30 important technical changes introduced in the Rosario 
plant during its lifetime, obtained by listing all the technical 
changes at the plant which were singled out for mention in the 
complete set of Acindar's annxial reports to shareholders. 
ii. A representative saraple of 54 R6D projects carried out by Acindar 
in its Rosario, Acevedo and Marathon plants between 1970 and 1974 on 
which detailed information was available thanks to its having been 
specially prepared for an Argentine government agency. 
Regarding the first sample of 30 important technical changes introduced 
in the Rosario plant, the reasons cited for these projects were; 
Table 4.1 Objectives of 30 important technical changes 
in the Rosario Plant 
Reasons given for introducing Number of technical changes carried out 
the technical changes for these reasons(out of 30 technical changes) 
1. To increase production capacity 16 
2. To improve product quality 8 
3. To reduce unit costs 7 Analysis of individual 
4. To introduce new products 5 reasons cited 
5. To react tu fulloff in input quality 2 
1. and 3. 3 Analysis of multiple 
1. and 2. and 3. 2 Reasons in those 
2. and 3. 1 projects when more than 
one was cited 
Source: P. Maxwell, Learning and Technical Change in the Steelplant of Acindar 
S.A, . in Rosario, Argentina, Monograph 4, BID/CEPAL, Buenos Aires, December 1976, p. 79, 
_ 1 7 
Table 4.2 Classification of the objectives of 54 Acindar RSD Projects 
Classification of the 
objectives being sought 
Number, and "Value" a/ of the 
projects in which this was the 
primary objective 
Number and "Value" a/ of the 
projects in which this was 
either the primary objective 
or a secondary objective 
Objective Number Value, U.S.S Number Value, U.S,$ 
I 
00 
Launch of new products 21 (39%) 532,000 (19%) 21 (39%) 532,,000 (19%) 
Increased capacity for 
existing products b/ 13 (24%) 1,304,000 (46%) 19 (35%) 1,793,000 (63%) 
Reduced production costs 10 (19%) 703,000 (25%) 17 (31%) 818,000 (29%) 
Improved quality of existing 
products 3 ( 6%) 35,000 ( 1%) 12 (22%) 492,000 (17%) 
Easing of raw material 
supply restrictions 6 (11%) 251,000 ( 9%) 6 (11%) 251,000 ( 9%) 
Better working conditions 1 ( 2%) 11,000 ( 0%) 3 ( 6%) 52,000 ( 2%) 
Totals 54 (100%) 2,836,000 (100%) 54 (100%) -2,836,000 (100%) 
Source of data: Calculated from data in Philip Maxwell, Implicit R&D Strategy and Investment linked R&D: 
A Study of the R&D Programme of the Argentine Steel Firm Acindar S.A., Working Paper 23, BID/CEPAL/PNUD, Buenos 
Aires, March 1979, plus suplementary data in Acindar's descriptions of these R£D projects as provided to the 
Argentine Sub-secretariat for Science and Technology. 
a/ By the "value" of the project, what is meant is the total expenditure incurred by Acindar on its own 
labour input to these R&D projects, both skilled and unsilled labour. This figure gives a rough order of 
magnitude of the size of the project. However it is only rough because other project costs, such as on machinery, 
raw materials for pilot runs, expenditure on laljour from outside firms etc., is not included. 
b/ In only one of these projects was the addition of completely new capacity, rather than the stretching 
of existing capacity involved. 
The most striking point to emarge is the high frequency of production 
capacity increase amongst the objectives for introducing technical changes. 
It is also clear that soma of the technical changes ware specifically aimed 
at more than one objective simultaneously. 
Coming no-fj to the second sample - referring to the 54 R£D projects drawn 
from all thrae of Acindar's plants - the information of these is sumsaarised in 
detail in Table 2, 
The iinportance of capacity-stretching emerges very clearly indeed from 
this tab^ lso 21}% of the projects had as their primary objective to increase 
production capacity for existing products (in every case except one by modifying 
existing equipEsnt, not adding new units - i.e. by stretching capacity.) And 
fully 35% of all projects had increasing capacity included amongst their 
objectives as either the primary or a secondary objective. Furthermore, if we 
pay attention to the "value" of the projects and not just their number, the 
significance of capacity-increasing projects is seen to be further enhanced. 
For projects with capacity-increase amongst their objectives accounted for 63% 
of total project value. Moreover all of but one of these capacity increasing 
projects involved capacity-stretching and not duplication of facilities, and 
this one project was of low "value". So projects with capacity-stretching 
amongst their objective accounted for nearly 63% of the total value of all 
the projects in the sample. 
So, analysis of both these samples of projects clearly supports our 
statements regarding both the pervasiveness of capacity-stretching projects 
and the ingjortsnce of capacity-stretching as a primay objective for technical 
changes in its own right as well as a secondary or spin-off objective alongside 
technical changes undertalcen for other reasons. 
Without going into details here, these statements are also strongly 
corroborated by the material in the USIMINAS and AHMSA reports where innumerable 
examples of capacity-stretching change are given and where in both cases the 
need to distinguish capacity-increase as a separate objective of technical 
change distinct from (though related to) cost-reduction is emphasided. 
Indeed the authors of the AHMSA study coma to the conclusion that 
"AHMSA's objective (i-ras) not profit maximisation but to provide 
the steel products demanded by the cotintry's indistrialization" so 
that "AHMSA's technological efforts have been mainly directed to 
increasing production as the priority objective" rather than in^ jroving 
quality or reducing costs. £/ 
In the USIHIMAS study, the authors present extensive evidence of capacity-
stretching technical change in the original equipment installed by the firm, 
and explicitly state that it is "useful to distinguish an increase in production 
as a separate objective" of technical change, b/ 
a/ AHHSA Report, p. 22, paragraphs 3 and 2, 
b/ USIIIIKAS Report, p. 62. 
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In short the "pervasiveness" of capacity-stretching projects and the fact 
that capacity-stretching was often an independent objectivo in its own right were 
observed in all three of the plants. 
- 20 -
5. ONE MAJOR INCENTIVE TO CAPACITY STRETCHING: THE DELAYING 
OR BLOCKING OF CONVENTIONAL EXPANSION 
It emerged in the steelplant studies that one of the main incentives which 
actually led Acindar, USIMINAS and AHMSA to stretch the capacity of their plants 
to such a notable extent, was the blocking or delaying of these firms' "conventional" 
expansion plans. To see this requires us to dip briefly into the history of the 
plants: 
5 = 1 Capacity-stretching in Acindar's Rosario plant 
We start sith the case of Acindar's Rosario plant. Chart 5.1 below shows 
that, apart from the notable "stretching" in the capacity of the plant's first 
Siemens Martin furnace achieved in 1949-50 the main "stretching" in the 
capacity of the plant's installation took place from the early 1960s onwards. 
Indeed from 1963-64 through to the early I97OS5 the chart shows how the 
capacity of the billet mill was stretched from around 10 to almost 20 tons 
per hour, whilst that of each of the Siemens Martin furnaces was stretched from 
around 3.5 to almost 6 tons per hour. 
Considering the obsolete character of the Rosario plant's installations, 
and the fact that this capacity-stretching was achieved on a deliberately low, 
indeed "shoestring" investment budget, one can well understand the pride which 
the Rosario plant staff and indeed Acindar's management, had in this achievement. 
Nevertheless, the key to understanding the story of capacity stretching in 
the Rosario plant is that Acindar's management never wanted or planned to keep 
the Rosario, plant going so long, nor to ingeniously "stretch" its capacity in 
the way they did. Far from wanting to extend the life of the Rosario plant, 
Acindar's management wanted to scrap it ever since around 195 3. 
To see why, one must realise that the Rosario plant was built in 191+3 at 
a time when the technology, the machinery and the skilled engineering help 
that would normally have been available from abroad to build a new steelplant 
was completely unobtainable, owing to World War 2 hostilities. So the plant 
got built thanks to the enterpreneurship and ingenious "do it yourself" 
technical improvisation- organised by Ace vedo, the founder of Acindar, 
a/ This was achieved by rebuilding the furnace to enlarge its inner volume, 
and by introducing the use of cupola furnaces to melt part of the scrap load. 
This part of the load could then be charged into the Siemens Martin furnace as 
"hot metal", thus speeding up both the charging and the melting cycle in the 
Siemens Martin. 
W Rosario's first Siemens Martin furnace went into action in 1943. This 
was enlarged and modernized in 1949. A second Siemens Martin, closely similar 
to the enlarged and modernized first one was also installed in this same year 
(1949). Subsequently3 a third Siemens Martin furnace, similar in size and 
design to the earlier tvo was added in 1963-64. 
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and his collegues. The resxilt was a samll-scale, patched-up, high-cost plant 
based on antique, partly second-hand technology. Even after the war when the 
plant was extensively modernized (with an additional small Siemens Martin 
funace, cupola furnaces for charging hot metal, a new ingot casting bay and a 
new small-scale billet mill) the plant was still far from the technological 
forefront. 
What was at the technological forefront was Acindar's second plant, built 
at Villa Constitución some 50kms. from Rosario, and started up in 1951. 
Quite unlike Rosario, the Villa Constitución plant was conceived right from 
the start as a large scale "high technology" plant. It consisted of a modern 
continuous Morgan combination rolling mill for bar, rod and skelp, with a 
capacity of 215,000 tons per year, making use of billets as its raw material. 
It was conceived by Acevedo as the first stage of what was to be a fully 
integrated plant at Villa Constitución. The idea was that iron ore would be 
delivered by river to the port at the Villa Constitución site; then blast 
furnaces, steel refining and primary rolling would turn the ore into pig 
iron, steel and finally into billets to feed the already-installed Morgan mill. 
Within this scenario, one can easily see why the small-scale originally 
improviséd Rosario plant (which also had the disadvantage'of being on a small 
inland site) was relegated to second place in the minds of Acindar's directors. 
The obvious place to invest and expand was in Villa Constitución, not Rosario. 
That was why the scrapping of the Rosario plant was always considered as 
either desirable, or likely to happen soon once the "integration project" for 
producing billets in Villa Constitución actually got underway. 
What interfered with Acindar's plans - and thereby prolonged the life the 
Rosario plant - was that the company's ambitious integration project for Villa 
Constitución ran into a succession of frustrating bureaucratic difficulties 
between 1953 and . 1975 arising iiictinly froTTi opposition on the part of the 
Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares (General Directorate of Military 
Production). 
Altogether six different specific projects put forward by Acindar - each 
of which would have led to the integration of the Villa Constitución plant -
were stalled or eventually frustrated from securing the definitive official 
approval and financial guarantees that were needed to proceed. It was not 
finally until 1975 that Acindar got the green light to integrate its Villa 
Constitución plant. 
Thus Acindar's persistent desire to substitute high cost, small-scale 
billet production on Rosario's outmoded equipment by lower cost larger-scale 
billet production on new equipment in Villa Constitución was persistently 
frustrated during more than twenty years. 
Furthermore these same hopes and uncertainties surrounding the integra-
tion project also ruled out the idea of a really thoroughgoing modernization 
of the Rosario plant - which would have involved scrapping the old Siemens 
Martin furnaces, ingot casting and billet rolling equipment in favour of one 
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or two modern electric arc furnaces and continuous casting facilities. This 
modernization was not carried out because of the expectation on the part of 
Acindar's directors that they would, before too long, get the go-ahead to 
integrate their Villa Constitución plant and would thus be able to avoid all 
the disadvantages inherent in having to keep producing steel on the cramped 
Rosario site and then having to transport the billets 50 kilometers to 
Villa Constitución for rolling on Acindar's Morgan mill. In other words 
Acindar's directors never wanted to invest heavily in modernizing the Rosario 
plant because they always expected that the "superior" option of producing 
billets in Villa Constitución would open up, and that the expected future 
lifetime of the Rosario Plant would therefore be short. So the "planning 
horizon" for the Rosario plant was therefore (a) always uncertain, and (b) 
believed to-have a sizeable probability of being extremely short. This 
explains why Acindar'd directors always sished to minimize any new investments 
in Rosario. 
Finally, as we have shown in detail elsewhere, ^ all of the other 
natural ways for Acindar to have substituted Rosario's supply of billets by 
lower cost billets from other sources were also ruled out by the circumstances 
prevailing in the Argentine steel industry and economic context in successive 
years. 
These above circumstances combined to repeatedly keep Acindar in a most 
curious position, consisting of: 
1. Having to maintain in action over more than twenty years an obsolete 
plant which they had always wanted to scrap. 
2. Having constantly to try to expand this plant's billet production from 
the early 60s onwards so as to contribute to a reasonable degree of 
utilization of capacity in Acindar's main rolling mill plant, which 
could not be kept adequatly provided by billets deriving from imports 
and domestic sources due to the frequently inadequate supply from the 
latter two sources. 
3. Having to achieve these two goals whilst restricting investment in the 
old plant to a bare minimum. 
In this position it was out of the question to completely modernize the 
plant, which would have cost far too'much, or to purchase a whole additional 
new production line to work alongside the existing one, which would also have 
cost too much, b/ The main avenue open to Acindar was therefore repeatedly 
See Acindar, Rosario Report (19 78 Version) p.p. 6 to 11. 
Actually Acindar did add to the plant a third small Siemens Martin 
furnace identical to its two existing ones in 19614. (This was much to the chagrin 
of the plant's engineers's who wanted at the very least a much bigger and more 
modem Siemens Martin even if they could not have an electric arc furnace.'). 
But this was the only instance of expanding plant capacity by the "conventional" 
means of duplicating existing production units. In every other main plant 
stage, the capacity of the existing installations was "stretched" and this was 
also done in the steelmaking section itself. 
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to seek to "stretch" the capacity of its existing installations at Rosario at 
the lowest possible investment cost. This is exactly what they did. 
5.2 Capacity-stretching in USIMINAS 
Our next example relates to the way in which production in USIMINAS's 
original plant vias stretched from the level reached in 1966 of 500,000 tons 
of flat products per year - which corresponded to the plant's nominal capacity -
to over lj200,000 tons per year by 1972. This was done without introducing 
any major new equipment units, and at very low investment cost. The reader is 
referred back to Table 5.1 where the impressive extent of capacity-stretching 
achieved in USIMINAS's various equipment units can be noted. Furthermore, 
Chart 5.2 below traces in detail the capacity-stretching achieved in USIMINA's 
BOF steelshop. We now look at the circumstances in which these very notable 
results were achieved. 
Like in the Acindar, Rosario case it must be said straightaway that a 
"stretching" on this scale was certainly not contemplated in the original plans 
for USIMINAS. What actually sparked off the succession of technical changes 
with which USIMINAS stretched the capacity of its plant was a deep financial 
crisis in the firm. 
Accordingly, we shall first describe how this financial crisis arose. 
Secondly, we shall describe how the "conventional" means which the 
directors of USIMINAS wished to use to increase their plant's output (and 
thence its sales and profits) so as to resolve their financias crisis were 
ruled out by the circumstances prevailing at the time - which then meant that 
the only alternative remaining was for USIMINAS to try to stretch the capacity 
of its existing installations at low investment cost. 
To begin with, let us see how USIMINAS got into a financial crisis. 
Several factors came together here. In particular: 
1. The original investment required to construct the plant escalated a lot 
compared to forecast. This was caused by rapid Brazilian inflation in 
between the plans and the actual construction period, as well as the 
devaluation of the Brazilian cruzeiro. £/ 
2. In 1964, just after USIMINAS started steel production, domestic steel 
demand in Brazil dropped by over 20% and did not fully recover until 
1968. b/ 
3. Coupled to the retraction in demand, USIMINAS had the problem of the near 
simultaneous entry into the market of the flat-products output of the 
other new state-promoted firm COSIPA - which accentuated excess capacity 
in several types of flat products, c/ 
a/ USIMINAS Report, p, i+7. 118, 119, 
b/ Ibid. p. 68. 
c/ Ibid. p. 73, 74, 76. 
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Chart 5.2 Capacity stretching in USIMINAS 
BOF Steelshop No. 1, 1963-72 
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U. Price controls introduced at the beginning of 1965 kept the price of 
steel at an artificially low level while the cost of inputs was allowed 
to increase as a result of rapid general inflation. This situation was 
not righted by the government until 1968. £/ 
5. Furthermores tariffs on imported steel products were reduced from an 
average 60% to 50% in 1966 and then to 40% in 1967, and on a 
siibstantial portion of flat product® to as low as 15% - thus stiffening 
the competition from iuports. b/ 
The net result of these five factors was that USIMINAS first built up 
large \mplanned debts before entering production (due to the inflated initial 
investment cost) and then found it difficult to correct the situation upon 
starting up production because its sales income was lowered by a combination 
of low prices, low effective domestic demand and competition from COSIPA and 
imports. 
Fortunately, this situación was perceived by USIMINAS early on, and led 
to two main responses by the firm designed to improve the situation. These 
were (a) a great emphasis on quality production for export sales which 
permitted USIMINAS to export 39% of its output in 1965, 18% in 1966 and 
33% in 1957, thus mitigating the domestic demand crisis; and (b) the 
launching by USIMINAS' directors of a strategy to greatly expand the plant's 
output so as both to increase sales income and reap economies of scale in 
investment costs and direct production costs. 
Indeed, as early as the 1965, USIMINAS's directors, in their annual 
report reckoned that to break even, USIMINAS would need to attain a minimum 
production level of 1 million tons per annum. In the same year, they 
accordingly drew up an expansion plan to reach 1 million tons, which 
estimated that investments of around U.S.$ 70 millions would be needed 
(on top of the figure of U.S.$ 270 million which the original plant was 
reckoned to have cost). £/ 
This first expansion plan was submitted to an international financial 
agency in 1965 but was not approved because of the high debt-sales ratio 
of USIMINAS and the low prices and demand prevailing in the Brazilian market. 
Later on, in 1966, a more detailed project to expand up to 1 million tons 
and a preliminary project for 2 million tons were submitted by USIMINAS 
to the Consultants then doing the planning studies for the Brazilian government 
on the future of the national steel industry - but these projects to expand 
USIMINAS were not approved either. 
In the event, it was only in 196 7 that the government-appointed Special 
Advisory Group on the Steel Industry finally recommended that USIMINAS should 
be authorized to expand up to 1.'+ million tons, a recommendation that was 
accepted in the 1968 National Steel Plan. This expansion was planned on 
Ibid. p. 74, 75, footnote to p. 77 
b/ Ibid. p. 76. 
Ibid. p. 47. 
- 27 -
the basis of substantial new investments and additions to the existing plant, 
e.g. additional coke and sinter plants, remodelling of the two existing blast 
furnaces, addition of a thir BOF converter, etc. However, although approved 
in 1968 the implementation of these additional investments for the expansion 
plan was slowed down by negotiations with the government backed Brazilian 
National Development'Bank on how they would be financed, and these were only 
finally resolved in late 1969, so that the new installations only began 
entering into operation from late 1970 onwards, a/ and the main new equipment 
units only in fact entered production in 1973. W 
In summary, if we term the expansion of plant capacity by siJDStantial 
additional equipment investments "conventional expansion", then what we have 
seen is that USIMINAS's own financial crisis coupled with the Brazilian 
Government's actual planning and financing decisions on the steel industry led 
to a situation whereby (a) USIMINA's conventional expansion plans were blocked 
by lack of finance between 1965 and 1969, and (b) the facilities 
corresponding to conventional expansion only came on-stream in 1973. 
Yet USIMINAS had already in 1965 realized that it urgently needed to 
increase sales income and reduce production costs through doubling its original 
capacity and production levels, so as to reduce its high debt to sales ratio. 
In other words the firm already had an urgent need in 1965 to expand 
production and sales, but little money to invest in making this possible. 
It was in these circumstances that "capacity-stretching" on the existing 
plant at low investment cost became a clearly attractive option and this option 
was then followed up consciously between 1965 and 1972. 
5.3 Capacity stretching in AHMSA 
Our third example is from the record of AHMSA and refers to capacity 
stretching in AHMSA's. Siemens Martin steelshop. Chart 5.3 shows that there has 
been a constant increase over the years in the production per hour from this 
steel shop. This has been to a large extent due to the installation of 
additional Siemes Martin furnaces, as is shown in the chart. Thus, the plant 
started with just one Siemens Martin furnace in 1944. A second and third 
were quickly added in 194-5 and 194 7. Then five additional, and larger 
Siemens Martin furnaces were added between 1953 and 1964. 
However, a further effect can be noticed 
in Chart 5.3. This is the 
tendency for the output per hour to increase in successive years when the same 
number of furnaces were in use. This is particularly noticeable from 1954 
onwards when all eight furnaces were working. 
As we shall see, this post-1964 effect is closely related to a particular 
"circumstance" in the AHMSA expansion story: namely the fact that 1964 was 
a/ USIMINAS Report, p. 120, 121.-
b/ Ibid. p. 123. • 
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the last year in which in an additional new Siemens Martin furnace was installed 
in AHMSA's steel shop its eight and final furnace of this type. 
In the normal course of AHMSA's further expansion to meet constantly rising 
levels of domestic steel demand, one would have expected further new Siemens • 
Martins to have been added d\iring the second half of the 1960s and the early 
1970s — however this was not done because AHMSA, following world trends, 
decided in 1967 that the more recently developed BOF (oxygen converter) 
technology for making steel was more economic than Siemens Martin steelmaking, 
and therefore that they would instal BOF in their further capacity expansions. 
As a result of this decision by AHMSA, it became apparet "that right from 
the planning stage for the first BOF shop the economic resources of the firm 
were principally directed to the future new steelshop, and the Siemens Martin 
shop began to get displaced so that investments in it were only directed to 
maintain it in operation rather than improve it", a/ 
This meant that - like in the Acindar and USIMINAS cases - any improvements 
from 1967 onwards of AHMSA's Siemens Martin steelshop were subject to a clear 
investment constraint (i.e. to a regime of low, or minimal new investment). 
It is interesting, therefore, to note - from the AHMSA study - that this 
situation of being "relegated to secondary status" W and being "practically 
condemned to disappear" led to a clearly.competitive response from the 
Siemens Martin personnel, who made increased productivity the "central objective" 
of their steel shop, b/ and who brought about a whole series of consequent 
technical changes at zero or very low investment cost, whose principle objective 
was to reduce production costs. W _£/ 
The authors of the AHMSA study are emphatic that this series of changes 
would not have been carried out were it not for the competition provided by 
the BOF shop, and the challenge thus presented to the Siemens Martin shop 
to improve performance so as to survive, or survive longer. (Here there is 
a veiy clear parallel to the Acindar Rosario situation where plant personnel 
always know that their plant was under "suspended sentence of execution". 
A further point - which the authors of the AHMSA study surprisingly do not 
make - is that in the years 1967 to 1972, when the new BOF shop was being 
planned and built, veri considerable "stretching" of capacity in the Siemens 
Martin shop took place. This can be seen in Charts 5.4 and 5.5. Thus, in 
£/ AHMSA Report, p. 90, paragraph M-. 
b/ Ibid, p. 88, paragraph 5. 
_£/ Ibid, p. 89, paragraph 1, p. 90, paragraph 5, 
£/ Ibid, p. 91, paragraph 4. 
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Chart 5.4 Indicators of Capacity-Stretching in AHMSA's 
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the three small Siemens Martin furnaces5 perfomance was boosted from around 
1.8 to nearly 3 heats per day between 1963 and 1971. In the five large 
Siemens Martin furnaces it was boosted from around 2.2 to near 2.8 heats 
per day between 1963 and 1972. 
At the same time, in both the small and the large furnaces, an additional 
element of capacity stretching was provided by noticeably raising the average 
weight of steel produced in each heat. 
The net effect of these two types of improvement was to stretch the 
production capacity of the small furnaces by approximately 81% between 1963 
and 1973, and that of the large furnaces by approximately 54% between 1963 
and 1972. a/ 
Our interpretation of this notable capacity-stretching is straight forward. 
It is that the years 1967 to 1972 represented a period when it was known 
that the BOF shop was being planned and would be coming on stream, but when, 
nevertheless, the expected output that would be obtained from it was obviously 
not yet available. 
This must therefore have put a clear premium on squeezing the needed 
extra output to satisfy demand from the existing Siemens Martin units - yet 
at low investment cost because this increased output would only be needed 
from the Siemens Martin the relatively short time-span expected to intervene 
until the BOF shop would start up. 
In these circumstances, of clearly "present" increased demand, but 
unavoidable "delays" in satis:^ing it on the basis of the newly-to-be-installed 
technology, the motivation for capacity-stretching at low investment cost seems 
clear enough, and bears an obvious, similarity to the situations which we have 
described previously for Acindar's Rosario plant and for USIMINAS. 
5.4 Summary 
In all three 
?ted to as a 
options that the firm would have liked to engage in were blocked or delayed. 
cases described above, capacity-stretching was extensively 
resort kind of "second-best" option when the conventional expansion 
a/ Furthermore these figures may well understate the true degree of 
capacTty stretching actually achieved, because in the period 1967-72 there 
was also a noticeable decrease in the fraction of the load to the Siemens 
Martin furnaces that consisted of liquid pig iron ('hot metal') from the blast 
furnaces. (The fraction of hot metal charged to the small furnaces dropped 
from about 75% to about 50%, and in the large furnaces from about 60% to 
about 45%). This meant that a greater fraction of the load to the furnaces 
consisted of cold scrap that had first to be melted, which would, other things 
equal, lead to a slower working cycle and therefore to less heats per day. 
This was evidently more than compensated by changes in operating techniques 
which speeded up the overall production cycle, and produced the capacity 
stretching that we have observed. 
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The effects of these blocks and delays was that expansion could not 
-temporarily- be brought about in any other way than by capacity-stretching 
within a low-investment constraint. 
Specificly it appears from the above cases that the following three kinds 
of circumstances provoked the blocks and delays to conventional expansion which 
in turn made capacity-stretching necessary. 
i. Rather long normal timelags inherent in the technological aspects 
of planning, designing, procuring, constructing, and starting-up 
whole a new plant stages or major sections thereof, (i.e. in 
"conventional" expansion). 
ii. Expected and unavoidable political and bureaucratic delays in the 
process of securing official permission to undertake major 
"conventional" plant expansions, and in securing available . 
government promotional incentives and/or financial guarantees. Plus 
the incidence of "unexpected" political and bureaucratic obstacles 
which lengthened the gestation period of the expansion project 
concerned and thus further delayed the date on which the desired 
increased output from the new plant could be expected to be available. 
iii. Investment constraints produced by financial crises in the firm 
- or by management's decision to concentrate most of its available 
resources on rival technologies or other parts of its activities. 
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6. EXISTENCE OF MAY OTHER INCENTIVES TO CAPACITY STRETCHING 
In the previous section we emphasized the major incentive to capacity-
stretching that arose when conventional output expansion was blocked or delayed 
because of external factors 5 investment constraints, or inherently long delays" 
in the gestation period of the major capital investments required for conventional 
expansion o 
However, the pervasiveness of capacity-stretching in the steelplants 
strongly suggests that incentives to it exist in a wider range of situations 
than merely those when it is a "second-best" option to conventionalexpansion 
plans. 
Indeed it appears that pervasiveness is in large measure due to the sheer 
variety of different incentives that were observed in the case studies to have 
motivated capacity stretching projects. Without attempting to be systematic or 
comprehensive, the following list of icentives, all drawn from the case-studies, 
will be, illustrative: 
i o Indivisibilities in steelplant equipment, which meant that small 
increments in demand coiild not economically be met by adding whole 
new units. 
ii. Disequilibrium inducements to stretch capacity caused by 
bottlenecks and/or imbalances in the capacities of different 
plant stages; 
iii. Accumaltion of experience due to leaming-by-doing in the daily 
operation of plants. This leads to the improvement of operational 
routines and the spotting of many minor design-defects and potential 
design-improvements which could raise capacity at low investment cost. 
iv. Temporary demand-peaks, which lead to efforts to raise the capacity 
of the existing plant, but which would not justify investing in 
extra new capacity. 
V. Stimulus provided by visits to other plants where capacity-stretching 
techniques are seen at work. 
vi. Stimulus provided by the wide diffusion in the trade lietrature 
of capacity-stretching innovations tried out successfully in other 
steel plants. 
vii. Stimulus provided through technical assistance contracts with a 
foreign steel producer or engineering firm that provide a channel 
for recommending innovations, including ones that stretch capacity. 
viii. The "perfomance'improving'instincts" of plant engineers keen to get 
more out of their existing equipments which leads them to work-up 
and recommend capacity stretching projects. 
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ix. The need for capacity-stretching as a pre-condition for securing 
cost-reduction achievable through greater output levels. 
X. The "spin-off" incentive in terras of capacity-stretching obtained 
"free" as a result of technical changes carried out primarily with 
other objectives in mind (e.g. to reduce production cost or improve 
product quality. 
This long list of different observed incentives for capacity-stretching 
- in conjunction with the incentive discussed in the previous section - goes 
some way towards explaining the "pervasiveness" of capacity-stretching efforts 
that we observed in these plants; for, clearly, a very large variety of "trigger 
events", both external to the plant and internal to it, can - and did - activate 
one or more of the capacity-stretching incentives mentioned. 
Furthermore the disequilibrium inducement to stretch capacity caused by 
bottlenecks or imablances in different plant stages seems to act as a "multiplier" 
of the number of capacity-stretching projects that steelplants engage in. This 
happens because almost any capacity-stretching initiative in one particular plant 
stage (whether-originally inspired by external or internal stimuli) is likely to 
stimulate or induce a further stream of secondary capacity-stretching adjustments-
to correct the new bottlenecks and imbalances that then arise. W 
So both the variety of different external and internal incentives to 
capacity-stretching and this "multiplier effect" help explain why capacity-
stretching projects were so "pervasive" in our plants, and also why their 
cumulative impact was so considerable. 
a/ Some examples of external "trigger events" which induced capacity-
stretching in our plants included: a) severe unplanned shortfalls in competing 
supplies or in imports due to production or. balance-of-payment problems - which 
led to temporary demand peaks for steel end products or intermediates, b) currency 
devaluations, rapid inflation, and government price controls, which enroded steel 
firm profitability and led to investment constraints ruling out conventional 
expansion, c) unusual or unexpected demand peaks caused by nes government-
subsidised public works programmes or by shortage of steel products on the world 
market, d) changes of plans by the government which blocked or delayed conventional 
expansions, e) autonomous demand increases which exceeded production capacity 
in different product lines. 
W "When a single innovation is adopted within an existing system of 
production, it sets up pressures and open opportunities for successive 'ripples' 
of change in other parts of the system. Such pressures may be manifest in 
successive bottlenecks at different stages of production as managemente strives 
to realize the full potential of an innovation. Alternatively, the adoption of 
an innovation at one stage of the process may impose more severe requirements 
for quality and uniformity at earlier stages. As a third, and more favourable 
possibility, the initial innovation may create or unblock a variety of 
possibilities for profitable change at other points in the production process...". 
William S. Pierce, The Ripple Effects of Technological Innovation, The Case 
of Iron Ore Pelletizing, Omega, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1974. 
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A more systematic approach to understanding pervasiveness, which relates 
it to some technological characteristics of the steel industry, is presented 
later on in Section 9. 
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7. METHODS USED TO STRETCH CAPACITY 
7.1 Existence of a "generic" set of capacity-stretching methods; 
A further finding that emerges from comparing the steelplant case-studies 
is the great similarity that can be detected in the methods used to strech 
capacity in the different plants. 
This similarity is specially notable, as would be expectedj between 
technologically similar units in the different plants - e.g. as between the 
Siemens Martin.funaces of Acindar (Rosario) and the Siemens Martin furnaces of 
AHMSA, or the blast firrnaces of USIMINAS and the blast furnaces of AHMSA, or 
between the various rolling mills in the different plants. 
But even more significant is that one can clearly detect a "generic" 
similarity between the capacity-stretching methods used across all these 
different technologies. In other words what appears to be underlying all the 
methods of capacity stretching observed is a central cluster of generic 
techniques - which presumably could also be applied to other metallurgical and 
process plants beyond the confines of the steel industry. 
To make this clear, we shall now list these 
techniques, and then comment briefly on them. 
"generic" capacity stretching 
The generic techniques that were used to stretch capacity in our steel-
plants seem to have been: 
1. Improving the characteristics, control, preparation 
classification and standardization of the raw 
material "charge" to the process iii question. 
LEADS TO HIGHER 
OUTPUT YIELDS PER 
TON OF INPUT AND 
LESS PROCESSING 
DIFFICULTIES WHICH 
CAUSE HALTS IN 
PRODUCTION. 
2. Increasing the usable volume of the containing 
vessels, in those cases where chemical reactions 
are involved. 
INCREASES BATCH 
SIZE AND THROUGHPUT 
PER VESSEL PER DAY. 
3. Varying operational and equipment parameters so 
as to speed up cycle-times in each component 
physical, mechanical or chemical stage of the 
process. 
INCREASES NUMBER 
OF 'CYCLES' AND 
HENCE THROUGHPUT 
PER DAY. 
4. Speeding up materials handling and transport 
betvjeen stages via improved mechanization 
and better layout. 
INCREASES NUMBER 
OF 'CYCLES' AND 
HENCE THROUGHPUT 
PER DAY. 
5. More precise and rapid process-control and 
quality control, via improved and more intensive 




1. HIGHER PRODUCT 
YIELDS PER TON OF 
INPUT. 
2. LOWER PRODUCT 
REJECTION RATES. 
6. Boosting the availability of processing units by INCREASES NUMBER OF 
incorporating more durable and reliable materials, ACTUAL PROCESSING 
components and accesorias in those parts of the HOURS/DAY PER 
units most svibject to wear out, and by developing YEAR, THUS BOOSTING 
maintenance aiid preventive maintenance techniques ANNUAL CAPACITY, 
which reduce the "down-time" of units needed for 
their cleaning, maintenance and repair. 
7. Redesigning, or upgrading the numbers, capacity FREQUENTLY A 
and reliability of auxiliary equipment units CONDITION FOR 
so as to match or permit faster cycle times in SECURING THE 
the main units. CAPACITY - IMPROVE-
MENTS OF TYPES 
1 to 6. 
8. Building up production experience which leads to CONTRIBUTES TO 
improvements in labour operating efficiency. FASTER CYCLE TIMES 
FASTER AND BETTER 
QUALITY CONTROL AND 
MORE RAPID MAINTE-
NANCE ACTIVITIES. 
Abimdant examples of all these generic capacity-stretching techniques can be 
noted in the case-studies. 
To illustrate, let us take just one of the mehtods of capacity stretching 
mentioned above - that of speeding up processing cycle-times. This theme 
appears again and again in the different equipment units in the different plants. 
Thus, in USIMINAS' and AHMSA's blast furnaces, cycle-timeswere raised by such steps 
as increasing blast pressures and temperatures, injecting oxygen into the furnaces 
and more uniform operation obtained by closer process control. In Acindar's and 
AHMSA's Siemens Martin steelshops faster cycles were achieved by speeding up 
scrap-loading, by using more hot metal in the charge, by the use of higher flame 
temperatures and oxygen injection to speed up the refining reactions. In rolling 
mills in all the plants, faster operation and cycle times were obtained by 
rewinding motors to increase rolling speeds, superior synchronization to lower 
"dead times" in between successive slabs or bars being rolled, more precise roll-
guides and tension guides to avoid production halts and "cobbles" etc. All these 
methods are also used in steelplants all over the world. 
But, is this result in fact surprising? Perhaps not, if one realizes that 
the idea of speeding up process cycles, which in turn increases capacity, is a . >" 
quite natural idea for steelplant engineers and technicians. Natural for 
engineers, too are such goals as minimizing production halts through better 
maintenance, and trying to acquire greater control ver process variables, and 
ideed all the other goals in our list as well. 
Thus, form an engineering viewpoint there is nothing actually surprising 
about our finding that capacity stretching projects in the categories mentioned 
above were found in all our plants. These are just the kind of things that 
engineers are trained to do. 
Nevertheless, a caveat is in order. Although the generic principles of 
how to stretch the capacity of steelplant units are easy enough to state, and 
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can be seen embodied in many examples in our case-studies, this does not mean 
they were easy to implement. There are two main reasons for this: 
1. The inherent complexity of process variables and lack of precise 
theoretical models to describe what is going on in blast furnaces, 
steel furnaces, and rolling operations mean that a great deal of 
empirical knowledge and experience needs to be gained so as to 
control and improve them successfully. 
2„ The actual detailed process conditions that characterize each 
steelplant are highly idios5mcratic because of innumerable 
variations between plants in terms of different equipment and 
raw material characteristics distinct grades of steel being 
processed, different size ranges of intermediate products, 
variations in operating practice and end-product specifications 
etc. - which means that simple copying of techniques used in 
other plants is usually impossible. 
As a result, capacity-stretching projects in our plants nearly always 
required a considerable input of in-plant know-how, design and experiment in 
addition to knowledge about those specific operational, equipment or maintenance 
innovations which might be suitable for the task. Also, of course, management 
agreement was required to invest the sums needed for modifying equipment, 
acquiring new auxiliary units, testing new operational methods-etc. 
This means that, although the generic capacity-stretching technics used 
were common across all our plants, the extent to which capacity-stretching 
potential was actually exploited in each plant was clearly dependent on 1) 
technical capacity of the firm, 2) its access to information about possible 
capacity-stretching innovations that could be introduced, and 3) the 
structure of economic incentives and of expected costs surrounding individual 
capacity-stretching projects and the way these were evaluated by the firm bearing 
in mind its investment policies, investment constraints and alternative investment 
projects. 
The impact of these three sets of variables (different in each plant) means 
that a simple comparison of our plants on the basis of their adoption or non-
adoption of certain kinds of capacity-stretching methods would tell us next to 
nothing about the comparative "efficiency" of the firms in exploiting the 
capacity-stretching potential of their plants. 
Nevertheless the case-studies ^  provide some interesting "pointers" 
concerning some of the more efficient and systematic ways of exploiting 
capacity-stretching potential. This is the subject of the next section, 
7.2 Pointers towards the systematic exploitation of stretching potential: 
Although a "direct" comparison of capacity-stetching efficiency in the 
three plants cannot be made, the case-studies illustrate two broadly different 
approaches to capacity-stretching, and also point towards an "evolution" from 
one approach to the other in each plant over time. 
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These two broad approaches can be characterized as 
1. The "ad-hoc, defensive" approach to introducing capacity-stetching 
innovations. 
2. The "systematic, offensive" approach to introducing capacity-stretching 
innovations. 
To see what is meant by these two labels, we shall give some examples from 
the case-studies. 
First of all consider the case of visits to other steelplants. In all the 
case-studies such visits were reported as important sources of ideas both for 
capacity-stretching and other kinds of technical changes. However, one gathers 
from the interviews carried out, and the reports themselves, that the visits to 
other plants were not usually systematically programmed but took place under the 
influence of an essentially random, hazard, and fortuitous set of factors - e.g. 
the impulses of senior managers to see other plants, the opportunities seized 
by younger staff sent abroad for training to look at plants in their host 
country etc. Indeed in the AHMSA Report it is clearly stated that "there did 
not exist an explicit and periodic programme of visits to exchange information 
about problems and solutions". 
An interesting contrast to this essentially "ad-hoc" approach to gaining 
information by visiting other plants is provided by an experience related in 
the USIMINAS Report. As from 1967 USIMINAS wanted to stretch the capacity 
of its steelshop from 600,000 to 700,000 tons per year, so what it did was 
to commission a study "of how its converters compared with those of 16 U.S. 
plants in terms of characteristics and production" W , - and this study showed 
that the increased capacity could be obtained with only minor specific changes 
in operating practice plus stengthening of some auxiliari units. What this 
example illustrates is the use of a systematic and precise scanning approach 
to the. information available from other plants - as opposed to the essentially 
"random" approach implied by occasional visits. Interestingly, amongst our 
plants, USIMINAS is also the one that most systematically scans the world steel 
literatura c_/, and also the one that appears to make the most systematic and 
creative use of external technical assistance. In this regard, it is not 
surprising that one of the most important innovations introduced by USIMINAS 
to stretch the capacity of its original steel-shop was the "three-holed oxygen 
lance" that was -suggested to the company by Nippon Steel with whom USIMINAS 
a/ AHMSA Report, p. 27. 
b/ USIMINAS Report, p. 170. 
£/ USIMINAS's Center of Technical Information "has the best library on 
steel in the country and maintains permanent contact with the main information 
organs in the country and in the world in order to collect information of 
interest... The Research Center has its own technical library staffed with 19 
persons with over' 5,000 books and its own subscription to 329 relevant 
technical journals and magazines apart from those in the main library". USIMINAS 
Report, p. 216. 
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had a ten-year technical assistance contract. £/ External technical assistance 
has also been important in AHMSA and in the Acevedo and Marathon plants of 
Acindar. 
A quite different illustration of the differences between an "ad-hoc" and a 
"systematic" approach can be gathered from the record of capacity-stretching in 
Acindar's Rosario plant. In Acindarj Rosario - in contrast to USIMINAS - the 
sources of technical change have been almost exclusively internal to the plant. 
Rather than scanning the technological horizons^ Rosario staff have always been 
concerned with "doing their own thing" and improving their technology with small 
resources and a lot of in-house ingenuity. In the rolling mills section, 
virtually all technical changes during many years were introduces as responses 
to particular machinery problems, breakdowns, and processing difficulties that 
cropped up during production and which interrupted smooth funcioning - i.e. 
fundamentally an "ad-hoc" troubleshooting approach. 
However, there was a further development, for in the period 1969 - 71 the 
men. who had spent many years attending to the Rosario mills with this trouble-
shooting" approach, had the opportunity to introduce substantial design 
modifications of their own into the plant's billet mill and its bar £ section 
mill. This led to two low-cost but highly effective projects - entirely designed 
in house - which both had an extremely notable capacity-stretching impact. 
Analysis of these two projects shows that they were based on the long-experience 
and detailed familiarity of their designers with virtually every facet of these 
mills, their operation, their design probmes, faults and possibilities. This 
enabled an extremaly precise, detailed and compehensive combination of modifica-
tions to be introduced in both cases which systematically exploited the available 
equipment, motor-horsepower, and space-available to the maximum extent at minimum 
extra investment cost. £/ 
The critical point in this example is the shift from an "ad-hoc" trouble-
shooting approach to a "systematic approach" which is made possible by the 
growth of familiarity with the process to be improved - this growth itself 
occurring due to the experience acquired in by plant staff operating the process 
and coping with the difficulties involved. 
This shift from an "ad-hoc" to a systematic approach based on growing 
process familiarity was clearly observed in all- our steel-plants. For example, 
in the AHMSA Report, we find the following passage which describes the sequence 
a/ USIMINAS Report, p. 172. 
b/ Indeed as experience built up, this came to be rationalized as a 
specific design philosophy, stated as follows: "To go along, eliminating passes, 
redesigning rolls so as to minimize problems, to roll with greater cross section 
wherever possible, to try to minimize production halts and nuisances, and if 
possible to withdraw men because it is pretty unpleasant type of work involving 
risks of getting burnt; to go along making adjustments in the elements or 
accesories of the mill which bring you problems". Source: Acindar Report 
(Draft Thesis Version), p. 9.25. 
c/ Both projects are described in detail in the Acindar Report (Draft 
Thesis" Version) Dp. 9.34 to 9.37. 
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of events after 1971 when the firm acquired a great deal of sophisticated 
"best-practice" new technology (including EOF technology) for the first time: 
"The degree of foreign technological dependence increases dirring 
the guarntee period because during this time any operational 
problem with the technology must be directly resolved by the 
suppliers. Once this period is over, a period of learning is 
necessary so as to get to know deeply about the functioning of 
the process and the equipment, during which external assitance 
is sought sporadically. Finally, starting from this knowledge-
base, a processo of trial and error is begim (without having 
a very solid theoretical basis ex-ante, but regularly generating 
one ex^post) in which the aim is to incrementally improve and 
optimize the operational routines laid down by the foreign 
equipment suppliers." a^/ 
In other words, it requires a considerable period of prior familiarization 
and "trial and error", before plant staff develop a good understanding of the 
interplays and subtleties of the complex set of equipment and process parameters 
and variables that they control. So it is only to be expected that early capacity-
stretching efforts will be more ad-hoc than systematic, and that these early 
efforts will usually arise in the course of trying to keep the process going 
when it is faced with specific operational difficxilties, rather than through 
unforced experimentation on potential improvements. 
This difference between "early" an "later" capacity-stretching is also 
borne out strongly by USIMINAS's experience. For example, in the sinter section 
"the initial effort was devoted to learning about the basic process 
itself, particularly the influence of various physical and chemical 
qualities of the pr-ocess. As these were leained, greater efforts 
were directed at controlling the basic characteristics of the raw 
materials. In large part this involved reaction to the variations 
in these qualities in the raw materials received. (Reactions to 
external fluctuations). Third, as more experience was gained, 
better methods were developed, including not only changes in raw 
materials used, their handling, preparation, weighing etc., but 
also of the process itself. To do this it was necessary to not 
only modify or add various pieces of equipment but to develop new 
organizational methods involving training, learning and studying 
various aspects of the process, b/ 
So we see that USIMINAS's experience confirmas AHMSA's and Acindar's in 
showing why one would expect to find later capacity-stretching efforts are 
characterized by a more comprenhensive, sophisticated - and "theory-intensive" 
approach tahn earlier ones. 
A further important characteristic of "later" capacity-stretching efforts 
was also detected in the case-studies. This has to do with the problem that 
a/ AHMSA Report, p. 24. 
b/ USIMINAS Report, p 
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as the more "obvious" capacity-stretching steps are taken, any further stretching 
will often depend on extending efforts to hitherto neglected components and 
aspects of the process. 
For example a "saturation" of this kind i-jas detected in USIMINA's steelshop, 
where if one reads through the list of measures being considered by the company 
for its "fourth wave" of capacity-stretching in this steelshop, what is striking 
is the cumulative number and range of the efforts being considered and the number 
of components identified for improvement. (These included changed operating 
practices in charging the converters, redimensioned ingot moulds, special 
refractory bricks for scrap and steel run-sites, new systems of inventories of 
spares, increased oxygen injection, holding extra pig iron reserves to insure 
against production halts, and improvements in calcination.) a/ What is reflected 
here is that USIMINAS apparantly wanted "no stone left unturned" in their efforts 
to stretch capacity further and further towards inherent design limits, and 
therefore were prepared to systematically try to improve virtually every component 
of the process - a task which evidently required extensive prior familiarity with 
the process concerned. A similarly "comprenhensive" approach to capacity-
stretching - via revising literally every possible component - was also a feature 
of the tx-ro projects in the Acindar Rosario rolling mills mentioned earlier. 
A final point worth making shilst dealing with the theme of "systematic" 
capacity-stretching is that neither in Acindar, nor in USIMINAS was there any 
clear idea beforehand of just now much they would in fact be able to strech 
capacity. So far as Acindar is concerned, back in the 1950s no-one conceived 
it possible, or thought of planning to stretch the Rosario plant's capacity to 
the extent that was finally achieved. The actual cumulative stretching finally 
achieved was the unplanned outcome of a long series of efforts carried out 
successively given the reiterative blocking of conventional options. 
As for USIMINAS, as late as 1969 its Annual Report spoke of the achieved 
steel production level of 790,000 tons as the "maximum probable production" 
that could be obtained with its existing installations - and then went on in 
succeeding years to stretch this level up to nearly 1,200,000 tons, b/ 
This suggests that both Acindar and USIMINAS (and quite probabley AHMSA 
too) understimated the terrific possibilities that actually existed for 
capacity-stretching. That they in fact achieved so much seems greatly due to 
adverse historical circumstances which made it economically urgent for them 
to strech their plants to a high degree. In other words it seems that "historical 
jolts" (or sets of jolts) helped these firms to wake up to the full-potential 
for capacity-stretching in their plants. Without these jolts (which involved 
mainly the blocks and delays in conventional expansion plans) it is doubtful 
if they would have been so systematic or successful. 
This completes our survey of "ad-hoc" versus "systematic" methods of 
introducing capacity-stretching technical changes. Our survey has not been 
comprenhensive - for space reasons - and, in particular, we have not mentioned 
a/ USIMINAS Report, pp. 172-3. 
b/ Ibid. p. 127 
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several important organizational steps which our firms took in order to reinforce 
their internal capacility to identify and implement capacity-stretching and other 
changes (e.g. the setting up of a "standard-cost" system, a/ and the setting 
up or reinforcing of several technical departments within the plants). However, 
enough has been said to show that our plants were able to develop a number of 
systematic approaches to capacity-stretching. These ranged from the systematic 
scanning and exploitation of information from other plants and the use of 
external technical assistance, through to the executing of comprehensive process 
modifications, based on plant staff's mastery of process kno-how that they 
acquired through experience. 
So in addition to demonstrating the existence of several "generic" capacity 
stretching techniques common to all the plants the case-studies also demostrate 
some ways in which the firms were able to exploit these techniques in a 
systematic way. 
a/ "Such capacity stretching (in the first 10 years of USIMINAS) was 
possible thanks to the implementation of a standard cost system with an 
elaborate organizational infrastructure to study its existing equipment, compare 
it to the best world perfomance, and then try to reach the same or higher levels." 
USIMINAS Report, p. 263; for details of the implementation of the standard cost-
system see USIMINAS Report, pp. 211-213. 
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8. SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In the previous pages - Sections 3 to 7 - we have sought to describe 
salient features of "capacity-stretching" observed in the steel plant case-studies. 
The main points which emerged were: 
lo The great quantitative extent of capacity stretching» 
2. The fact that its implementation at low investment cost was to 
a significant extent fuelled by the Blocking or delaying of 
conventional output expansion plans» 
3. There were also many other kinds of incentives to capacity-
stretching, which together with the "multiplier effect" of 
the bottleneck-imbalance incentive, help account for the 
"pervasiveness" of capacity-stretching projects that we noted 
in the plants. 
H. Capacity-stretching was often the priority objective involved 
in carrying out technical changes, and cannot be considered 
as always a sxibsidiary objective realted to cost-reduction; 
it has legitimate status as an independent category of technical 
change, though its complementarity to cost-reduction certainly 
deserves exploration. 
5. There appears to exist a "generic" set of methods for stretching 
capacity, whose use was common across all the plants and technologies 
within the plants; this is intelligible from an engineering viewpoint; 
however process-complexities and marked plant idiosjmcracies mean 
that it was not a simple matter to apply these generic methods 
because straightforward copying of techniques used in other plants 
is not viable in this industry. 
6. Both "ad-hoc" and more "systematic" approaches to stretching 
capacity were detected in the study - the latter heing closely 
related to gaining familiarity and knowledge about process variables 
and how to control them; also some systematic ways of exploiting 
Information from other plants and from external technical assistance 
were noted; finally it was observed that at least two of our plants 
had initially greatly underestimated the extent of capacity 
•"Stretching that they would be able to achieve. 
Although these above results are drawn from studies of just three plants, 
we believe that the phenomenon they describe - i.e. capacity-stretching - is a 
widespread one in steel-plants. In fact we shall argue in section 9 below 
that it arises mainly because of inherent features of steel technoloy, common 
to all plants in the industry. 
POP economists interested in firm technological behaviour it then becomes 
a challenge to incorporate "capacity-stretching" technical change into a model 
of how entrepreneurs are supposed to "adjust" their plants to changing market 
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circumstances and technology. It also becomes intérestirig to see how "capacity-
stretching" technical changes relate to the better known category of "cost-reducing" 
ones. ."Hiesetwo matters are taken up in Sections 10 and 11 below. Section 
12 • prjoyides a. model which explores some of th'e variables affecting the choice 
of conventional expansion versus capacity-stretching expansion in meeting demand 
increases. Finally, Section 13 sums up the Conclusions reached in this study. 
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II INTERPRETATION AND MODELS 

9. AN INTERPRETATION OF WHY CAPACITY-STRETCHING IS PERVASIVE 
The sheer extent and pervasiveness of capacity-stretching which we observed 
in all the case-studies suggests they are a consequence of some inherent techno-
logical features of the steel industry. 
If this is correct, then we can expect the phenomenon of capacity stretching 
to be of general incidence in all well-run steelplants serving growing markets, 
and not just an isolated phenomenon confined to the observed Latin American 
plants. 
Also, if we can pinpoint the technological determinants of capacity-stretching, 
this will help in developing an adequate theory of it. 
We believe that the following four technological features of steelplants 
are mainly responsible for the pervasiveness: i) very large capital requirements; 
ii) great complexity of process; iii) multi-stage, sequential nature of process; 
and iv) economies of scale leading to major indivisibilities in equipment units 
in several process stages. 
The way these features encourage capacity-stretching is set out in Diagram 
1 overleaf. 
The diagram shows how these features of steelplants lead to capacity-
stretching due to four different sets of factors: 
1. Long "adjustment delays" in conventional expansion which encourage 
capacity stretching as an alternative, at least temporarily. 
2. The prevalence of imbalances and bottlenecks in steel-plants (due 
to both the multi-stage character of the industry and to major 
indivisibilities in equipment units) 
- which signals clearly to engineers where 
incremental capacities are needed. 
3. The fact that "learning-by-doing" with complex steel process 
often leads to rated capacities being gradually exceeded as 
firms gain experience. 
The fact that conventional capital-intensive expansion 
- even in the basence of adjustment delays - takes place 
at discrete intervals of time. 
We shall now discuss each of these four sets of factors in more detail, 
pointing out their implications for capacity-stretching. Finally, we shall 
briefly mention several other factors that also encourage capacity stretching. 
- 51 -
9.1 Long "adjustment delays" in conventional expansion. 
Overall complexity of steelplant technology leads to sophisticated and 
time-consuming requirements in the planning, designing, procuring, constructing 
and starting up of major "conventional" expansions of steel capacity - (i.e. 
entirely new plants, or major capital-intensive expansions of existing plants). 
This leads, necessarily, to a long "gestation period" for conventional 
expansions, starging from the moment the investment is firmly decided upon and 
approved by the necessary authorities. In fact, economists recognise the 
existence, within the gestation period, of a "construction period" and then a 
"start-up" period which goes from the beginning of production through to the 
achievement of production at rated capacity levels. £/ In the steel industry, 
the overall gestation period (i.e. construction plus start-up) can last from 
2 to 7 or more years. 
However, for planning purposes in the steel industry it is indispensable 
to also recognise an additional previous delay period (which economists have 
termed the "pre-investment" period) during which a) the feasibility report for 
the proposed conventional expansion is prepared, b) government agreement to the 
project itself, and to providing the firm with promotional incentives and other 
financial help, is sought, and c) loans to financie the project are negotiated 
with national and international banks, and from the equipment suppliers. The 
need for all three of these steps is directly related to the hughe capital 
requirements of the industry, W and the long amortization periods involved, 
which nean that firms' internal fund sources are usually grossly insufficient 
for investing on the required scale. 
This additional "pre-investment" period, can also be long, and is quite 
regularly measured in years, particiilarly when the home government's project 
planning and approval procedures for its steel industry have become subject to 
paralysing policital conflicts £/, or, to put it more politely, "administrative 
rigidities". 
Our term "adjustment delay" is explicitly intendend to describe the overall 
delay involved in conventional expansion projects in the steel industry. This 
Some tuning of equipment, and production from parts of plants, may 
often begin before the construction period has ended. Eckhaus (1973) refers 
to the period starting from tuning of equipment up until full rated plant 
capacity is achieved as the "maturation perio". However, the better known 
term "start-up period", see Baloff (1963) 2/ - is preferable. 
W For new capacity, investments of hundres of millions of dollars would 
be normal for semi-integrated plants, and thousands of millions of dollars for 
integrated plants (roughly $ 1,000 million per million tons of annual ingot 
capacity). 
c_/ This has certainly been the case for many years in the Argentine steel 
industry. See Maxwell (1976) _3/ It has also been a major factor at times 
in the British and Indian steel industries, and is common in many other countries 
as well - the major source of political conflict often being the priority of 
public sector vs. private sector firms. 
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Diagram 9.1 Explanation of why Caijaoity Stretching is Pervasive in '^.teelpjants 
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obviously includes both the "pre-investment" period and the "gestation" period. 
The sheer length of the adjustment period - even for the most efficiently 
and rapidly financed and excecuted conventional expansions - is such as to rule 
out conventional expansion as a "short run" response available to a firm for 
varying its output in response to market conditions. Conventional expansion is, 
inherently, a "long-run" measure. 
This explains why - if a firm is interested in increasing its output in the 
short to medium run, and finds itself unable to do so because of having reached 
bottlenecks in one (or more) stages of its existing plant - then "capacity-
stretching" can become an economically attractive response. 
9.2 The prevalence of imbalance and bottlenecks in steelplants. 
A further powerful incentive to capacity-stretching is that imbalances and 
bottlenecs are extremely prevalent and frequent in steelplants. This has to do 
with the "multi-stage sequential character" of steelmaking which means that 
careful synchronization of input and output flows between stages is required, 
so that bottlenecs in one or more stages may restrict a plant's overall production 
capacity shilst unused surplus capacity can exist in the other stages. We shall 
now explain why bottlenecs and iirfcalances are in fact so prevalent, and why they 
often lead to capacity streching. a/ 
A first major reason has to do with the marked indivisibilities that 
characterize steelplant equipment units in several main processes h/. The effect 
a/ In a multistage industry integrated plants command some advantages over 
semintegrated plants due to the absence of, or imperfections in markets for 
intemediate products. In the case of steel, for physical reasons, there are no 
markets for hot metal, either hot pig iron or hot steel, which is the intermediate 
output/input of some of the stages. An integrated producer uses hot pig iron 
directly; however if a semi-integrated producer wanted to use liquid pig iron as 
an input, he would have to buy cold pig iron and then melt it in order to proceed 
with the process. In addition we encounter other reasons which generate imperfec-
tions in the markets for intermediate outputs and conrr'esponding advantages of 
integrated over semi-integrated plants: for example the periodic difficulty (or 
inipossiblity) of obtaining large supplies of intermediates at short notice, costs 
of transportation and other barriers to trade, and the difficulties sometimes 
encountered in obtaining the exact qualities of intermediate goods which can match 
the requirements of the other sectors downstream in the process (e.g., steel grades 
for rolling specific products). 
However there is another side to the coin - which is that the integrated producer 
has more stages in which a production problem can give rise to a bottleneck which 
holds up production in the rest of the plant. 
b/ These indivisibilit ies are associated with economies of scale in capital 
equipment costs per ton of capacity and in operating costs per ton of output. For 
example, in modem large integrated plants the average output per unit of 
equipment such as blast furnaces, oxygen converters and strip mills can be over 
2 million tons per individual unit per year. The Japanese have built blast 
furnaces with outputs of over 4 million tons per year. 
- -
is that iKcr-emsntal capacities in these stages cannot econoaicelly be created by 
adding whole nez<i uaits» As a resxilt it is norcal for the most "indivisible" 
units to ba deliberately "oversized" when plants are designed;, a/ and - in 
conseqiience - under-utilised at the initial capacity for which the plant is 
constructed. "Hius plants o'ften start out life unbalanced. Thea, when output 
has to be built up in increasntal steps beyond initial capacity^ further ^ 
capacity can be progressively added in the more divisible stages so as to match 
the surplus capacity available in the oversized units. This may be done either 
by adding further equipment units in these more divisible stages of the process 
or by "stretching" the capacity of the existing units in these divisible stages, 
or by a combination of the two. 
Either i-jay, this awids the expense involved in acquiring whole new 
indivisible units to (expensively) service incremental demandss and also avoids 
the icajor esqjense involved in the disruptions to plant foundations wirign^ layout, 
materials flows etc. that would be required whenever a very large unit has to be 
integrated into an existing production scheme. 
However, there is an additional aspect of "indivisibilities" to consider 
which is that in steelplants the smelting, refining and main rolling stages all 
involve major indivisible units, and these may very easily be out of balance 
relative to each other. So once the capacity of one of these stages has been 
reached, then - if output has to be increcientally increased - the only alternative 
to buying a new indivisible unit and causing major plant disruptions is to try 
to "stretch" the capacity of the indivisible miit(s) in the stage which is now 
limiting the plant's output. In other words, initial design imbalance between 
the plant stages which contain the most indivisible units will eventxaally lead 
- as output is increased - to strong capacity stretching signals, in that stage 
(amongst those sítli ihe laost indivisible units) which has the least capacity. 
Next, quite apart from the imbalances between plant stages which result 
from the initial plant design, there are several factors which tend to continually 
create and recreate imbalances bettíeen the various stages of the process. 
One such factor is the "uneven" character of exogenous technological progress 
in the industry. All plant stages are of course open to exogenous technological 
progress. Indeed, the great variety of technological processes in the indiistry 
b/ assures that innovations across a broad range of technology may be of use 
inside steelplants. But it cannot be expected that exogenous innovations will 
stimulate progress in all plant stages at excatly the same rate. If a plant 
adopts, for example, a blast-furnace innovation which raises its pig-iron 
production capacity, this will leave its steel refining capacity unaltered. 
Similarley adoption of an improved oxygen lance for refining will leave the 
a/ This is the classic problem studied by H. Chenery (1952) and 
A. Mamie (1S67) 5/. 
b/ Steelplants incorporate thermal, mechanical, chemical, metallurgical, 
therao-Eschanical, terEo-chetaical, electro-chemical processes. As Baloff (1963) 
has pointed out -^a study of steel processing is... equivalent to studying 
several machir-o-intensive industries". 
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rolling capacity unaltered. Thus the adoption of exogenous inventions may easily 
"unbalance" an initially balanced set of capacities in successive stages of a 
plant. 
Another factor which creates imbalance is "breakdowns", which are prevalent 
in steelplants due to the intense thermic and mechanical stresses involved in 
heating, pouring, shaping and transporting thousands of tons of dense metal per 
day through the successive plant units. Breakdowns of any dxiration cause serious 
bottlenecks, and when a particular stage repeatedly has breakdowns, this can 
easily lead to a) more intensive preventive maintenance procedures and b) some 
modifications to the particular main or auxiliary units involved so as to avoid 
the problem causing the breakdowns, or to make the machinery more robust so as 
to stand up better to the stresses involved. Both procedures tend to have the 
effect of "stretching" the capacity of the stage involved, so that it no longer 
represents a bottleneck. 
Thirdly, the "learning by doing" process which plant staff engage in (which 
we shall be examining in more detail in the next subsection) also tends to 
gradually and perpetually create surplus capacities and imbalances between 
successive stages. 
Finally, the sin^ ile effect of "overshooting the mark" when adding 
capacities to correct bottlenecks, also leads to the perpetual re-creation of 
imbalances. This is also called the "see-saw" effect, and it was very common 
in the plants we studied. The implication is that almost any capacity-stretching 
initiative (whether originally inspired by external or internal stimuli) is 
likely to stimulate or induce a further stream of secondary capacity stretching 
adjustments to correct the new bottlenecks and imbalances that then arise, and 
so on. 
The net result of all these factors, is that imbalances and bottlenecks 
are a permanent feature of steelplant evolution, even though their locus tends 
to shift from stage to stage (as well as within stages) as output is increased. 
Indivisibilities, exogenous iventions, breakdowns, leaming-by-doing and 
overshooting all contribute to the prevalence and constant re-creation an 
re-location of bottlenecks - and to the corresponding pervasiveness of signals 
for adding incremental capacity in the bottleneck stage. This is often done 
by capacity-stretching. 
9.3 The effect of learning-by-doing. 
Another reason for pervasive capacity-stretching concerns the "learning 
process" that plant staff engage in with regard to controlling and manipulating 
the complex set of variables associated with steel processes - which leads 
gradually up to the attainment of rated capacity and then reaching beyond it. 
A point here is that engineers in steelplants (indeed in industrial plants 
generally) do not have such a rigid, fixed notion of a unit's "capacity" as 
do economists. 
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In fact, capacity in the particular idios3mcratic working conditions of 
each plant a/ is always something that can only be accurately determined in 
practice once the plant is going; also the highly complex and not 100% determinate 
nature of steel processes W forces plant engineers into a process of "empirical 
trying out" and feedback so as to get to know the quirks of the process and 
gradually use the feedback to develop better "heuristics" for controlling and 
dominating it. 
In this learning process, engineers conceive of capacity as something that 
can be varied by alterations in process conditions, in equipment, or in operating 
or maintenance methods. 
Thus, engineers in steelplants first grope towards achieving "rated" 
capacity, and then try to grope beyond it by using their experience to suggest 
the appropiate changes in equipment, settings, procedures, etc. This process 
is, of course none other than "capacity-stretching". Its prevalence in steel-
plants can, in the last analysis, be traced back to the inherent complexity of 
the variables involved in steelplant processes, which challenge the "perfomance-
improving-instincts" of the engineers and technicians responsible for operating 
them. 
9.4 The effect of indivisibilities on the timing of conventional expansions. 
Indivisibilities and plant economies of scale dictate that "conventional" 
capital investment geared to continuously increasing demand should take place 
at discrete intervals of time. Chenery IJ and Manne have proven that 
this pattern is optimum (cost minimizing) for single-stage plants without any 
adjustment delay in conventional expansion. Thus, the capacity stretching 
signals that arise during the intervening periods, do not simply depend on 
steel being an industry in which conventional expansions are characterized 
by long adjustment delays. The latter factor does have the effect of increasing 
the intervals between major conventional investments in practice. But these 
intervals would already be quite long anyway for indivisibility reasons. 
9.5 Other incentives to capacity stretching. 
In addition to the four "technological" factors mentioned above, which all 
contribute to the pervasiveness^  of capacity stretching in steel plants, several 
further incentives to capacity stretching clearly exist. For example some were 
£/ Actual process conditions that characterise individual steelplants are 
idiosyncratic because of innumerable variations between plants in terms of 
different equipment and raw material characteristics, distinct grades of steel 
being processed, different size-ranges of intermediate products, variations in 
operating practices and end-product specifications etc. 
W The inherent complexity of process variables and the lack of precise 
theoretical models to describe what is going on in blast furnaces, steel 
furnaces and rolling operations means that a great deal of empirical knowledge 
and experience needs to be gained so as to control them efficiently. 
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already noted earlier in Section 6. 
Below we simply list, without discussion, several of the further incentives 
which a complete theory of capacity-stretching would need to take into account. 
a) Investment constraints produced by financial crisis in steel firms. (May 
be caused by poor management or by the effect of government measures 
such as price-controls on steel products, or imexpected sharp devaluations 
which greatly increase the burden of firms' hard currency debts). 
b) Investment constraints due to refusls of relevant institutions to 
financie conventional expansion projects, even though the firm itself 
is financially soiond.. 
c) Macroeconomic uncertainties: a low-risk policy when demand is very 
variable, even if on the average it is growing. 
d) Trends in technology: may be useful to delay investments while some 
emerging new technologies prove themselves. 
e) The "spin-off" effects in terms of capacity-stretching of technical 
changes carried out primarily with other objectives in mind (e.g. 
to reduce production costs or improve product quality). 
f) The need for capacity-stretching as a pre-condition for securing cost 
reduction of the "Hollander" variety achievable through greater output 
levels. 
g) The fact that experience and skills gained in the process of capacity-
stretching can prove extremely valuable in leading to improved plant-
design and faster construction and start-up when the firm undertakes 
its next conventional expansion. 
h) The fact that the "objective function" of some steel firms in certain 
periods may be to maximise output rather than profits. 
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10, CAPACITY STRETCHING ALONG THE ADJUSTI'JEMT PATH OF THE FIRM 
The empirical findings reportad in Section 5 and the discussion in Section 
9 have shovm that a major stim-olus toifards capacity stretching derives from the 
existence of an adjustment delay in con-veational capital intensive expansion. A 
once and for all upmrd shift in demand will eventually lead a steel firm to a 
new long rim equilibrium involving an additional and/or a bigger plant. But since 
this takes time, due to the adjustment delay and to other factors (securing 
government approval, finance5 etc,) capacity stretching may represent a rational 
response in the medium run, a/ 
Assxime a single producer being in long-riai equilibrium at point A of 
Figure I5 where marginal revenue I^Q equan.ls both long run marginal cost LRMC 
and short run marginal cost SRMCo The amount of output produced is q = This 
output is produced by a plant i-jhose average (short-rxsn) cost curve is SRAC, 
which is tangent at point ci to the long run average cost curve b/o Assume a 
once and for all increase in demand which leads to a shift in the marginal revenue 
curve from MR^ to The long run equilibrium position of the firm is D^at 
the intersection between MR^ and LRMC, This position will be attained afeter 
0 periods 5 where 0 is the adjustment delay required for operating the most 
efficient- plant associated with the neti equilibrium level of output q^, 
What is the optimum behaviour during the adjustment period? 
Conventional theory would state that the firm should continue using the old 
plant.but at higher capacity levels^ i,e, by adding variable factors such as 
raw materials and labor. This woiild lead us to point 3 in diagram la. The firm 
would then remain at B from t = 0 to t = 6 and then would jump to D. (i.e., 
output would jump from q, to q, ), The alternative possibility suggested by the 
steel plant case studies xs to "stretch" the capacity of existing fixed factors, 
which means that the marginal operating costs of additional output will decrease 
a/ Capecity stretching does not occur ither in Vineras short-run or in his 
long~run (see Viner V), lihile involving some change in fixed factors and in 
scale of plant, it is not a change which is the optimal one for the long-rtin 
level of output of the firm. We therefore identify capacity stretching as taking 
place in the "medium run". For expositions similar to our's see Ryan and Pierce 
and Vickrey V ' IJhether the long run involves building a completely new plant 
or the enlargement of the existiag plant depends on factors which vary across 
industries, Viner seems to assume that both alternatives are identical. This is 
not the case in steel since the desirability of enlarging existing plant may. be 
very limited due to the fact that a lot of the investment is "sunk" (specific 
to the original plant). This kind of situation is envisaged by Vickrey %rho states 
that "one is likely never to have the opportunity, even in the vety long run, of 
making a completely'fresh start" (Vickrey^ V p, 197), 
b/ Notice that q is produced by om" single producer in a plant whose 
minimum AC output level (Viner's measure of '"scale" of plant) exceeds q^. This 
contracts with the long-run of competitive firm having a U-shaped LRAC curve 
- the equilibriuin output level equals the '-scale" of the corresponding plant. In 
both cases, however, the AC of the equilibriuia outpiit level at the long run 
plant is lower than the AC that would be incurred by any other plant. 
SI -
in relation to their level in an unstretched plant A possible outcome of 
this stretching would be the "medium range" average and marginal cost curves MRAC 
and MRMC and output level q^ q^^ (both the MRAC and the MRMC excludes the 
fixed costs of stretching). The term medium range is supposed to indicate that 
the delay in implementing capacity stretching is shorter than that of implementing 
conventional capital investment. A stretched plant like the one whown in Figure 
la would anable output to increase more during the adjustment period. 
The path of output under both alternatives is shown in Figure lb. The curves 
reflect some additional considerations not touched upon till now: i) The new 
long-run equilibrium output q^ is rarely achieved "in one jump" at point Q 
on the time axis; rather q^^ is built up via a learning curve. Also, since 
the expansion may mean enlargement or radical modernization of the existing plant, 
then there is usually a period of lower output from the existing plant whilst it 
is being integrated into the larger complex, ii) The increase in output under 
capacity stretching is seldom achieved in one jump; some kind of learning process 
is involved leading to capacity stretching in a series of spurts. 
The shaded are between the two curves is the acumulated increase in output 
which was optimum to produce, given the particular capacity stretching undertaken. 
It will depend on the following factors: the additional discounted revenue 
derived from the higher output levels; the additional operating costs (labor and 
raw materials) and the fixed costs of implementing the capacity stretching. The 
final outcome is not shown in the diagram, but the discussion of the previous 
sections suggests the following: i) that there are a series of capacity stretching 
opportunities in steel plants: ii) that at least some of them are profitable 
under á wide variety of cost and demand conditions. 
a/ Operating costs do not include the research, development, engineering 
and capital costs of stretching capacity ("fixed costs of stretching"). They 
basically include the^costs of labor and of raw materials. 
- 62 -
» * 










Q . c Q. 
LRAC 
References to Section 10 
J. Viner, "Cost Curves and Supply Curves" in American Economic,Association, 
Readings in Price Theory, George Allen and Unwin, 1953, Ch. 10. 
Ryan and Pierce, Price Theory, St. Martins Press, New York, 1977. 
W. Vickrey, Microstatics, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1961+. 
- 64 -
11. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPACITY-STRETCHING AND COST-
REDUCING INNOVATIONS 
In this section we shall examine how "capacity-stretching" technical changes 
relate to the more familiar category of "cost-reducing" technical changes. It is 
already clear empirically that the two kinds of technical changes are often closely 
connected. However, as noted in the Introduction, one reason why "capacity-
stretching" technical changes have not received very prominent attention in the 
literature is because they tend to be subsumed as just an aspect or mechanism 
within the class of "cost-reducing" changes. As a result the literature does not 
offer much help in discriminating the two kinds of changes. The question therefore 
arises - what distinctions can be made, and what inter-relations delineated, 
between these two kinds of technical changes? Or, to put it in a more graphic 
manner - can these "siamese twins" be separated? 
An exercise which we think will be helpful in this regard is to compare what 
has been reported here about "capacity-stretching" changes with the two main kinds 
of cost reducing technical changes as defined by Hollander. 'U 
The first kind are called by Hollander "direct" cost-reducing technical 
changes. These are technical changes which act directly on average production 
costs by reducing input requirements per unit of output even at unchanged levels 
of output. 
The second kind consists of technical changes which are volume-related, and 
which Hollander calls "indirect" technical changes. a^/ They involve alterations 
to existing machinery or procedures which, alghough they may not result in a 
decrease in unit costs at unchanged levels of output, nevertheless permit the 
machinery to function at greater output levels than before - with the result that 
if this higher level of output is indeed produced, then the fixed costs can be 
spread over a larger volume of output than before, thus resulting in a decline 
in unit operating costs, b/ 
a/ The following quotations from Hollander are relevant here: "Because of 
the high proportion of overhead cost, and generally the potential importance of 
scale economies, a large part of the effort made by research departments has been 
toward the more intensive utilization of given plant and equipment. Thus the 
attempts to increase the spinning speed and the denier (in some instances) have 
been directed towards this end. Similarly, efforts directed toward improved 
properties of ayon yarn have been, in part at least, influenced by the desire 
for high output. We refer to development of these kinds as indirect technical 
changes." "If, as a consequence of increased production, costs per unit fall 
(relatively fixed items being spread over a greater volume)' then the economies 
will be regarded as the result - albeit an indirect result - of technical change." 
Notice that Hollander's "indirect" technical changes are not the same 
as a third category of technical change observed by Hollander which he called 
technical changes "induced by an increase of output". The principal example given 
of this third category is when increased output permits the introduction of more 
efficient machines which have been known but which only become profitable at new, 
hipher rates of production. Hollander is at Dains to contrast these technical 
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At first glance, Hollander's "direct" cost-reducing technical changes may 
seem to have nothing to do with our capacity-stretching technical changes. They 
would seem to be a kind of "pure" cost-reducing technical change. However this 
is not necessarily so. For, actually, Hollander only defines his "direct" 
technical changes in terras of tehir effect in reducing costs at unchanged levels 
of output. It is, however,'quite possible to spécify several kinds of technical 
changes common in industrial plants which both reduce costs at imchanged levels 
of output (i.e. are direct in Hollander's sense) and simultaneously permit or 
provide increased plant output capacity. (Two examples from sfeelplants include 
i) improved process control which leads to increased metallic yield through a 
lower fraction of defective output and ii) better operational practice leading 
to more durable refractory linings. These changes not only reduce metal or 
refractory inputs (i.e. costs) per unit of output but also raise capacity through 
less defective output in the first case and less down-time for changing refractories 
in the second case.) In other words, some of Hollander's "direct" cost reducing 
changes also have a capacity-stretching effect as well. 
Clearly, though, it is Hollander's second category - of "indirect" cost 
reducing technical changes which is closest in spirit to what we have been calling 
"capacity-stretching" technical changes. 
Nevertheless, here too, we can observe that Hollander's definition is somewhat 
restrictive. For Hollander's "indirect" technical changes produce cost reductions 
only through their effect on fixed plant costs - by spreading these costs over 
the larger volume of output that indirect technical changes permit to be produced. 
In contrast, indirect technical changes are assumed to have no effect on variable 
plant costs. In other words, Hollander's "indirect" technical changes are a kind 
of "special case" of capacity stretching changes with no effect on variable plant 
costs. The restricted range of this definition lies in the fact that it is 
perfectly possible to visualise capacity stretching changes which do have effects 
on variable plant costs, either raising them or lowering them. We shall return 
to this point in more detail below. 
Another problem with Hollander's definitions of technical change - which 
limits their ability to illuminate the capacity-stretching phenomenon - is that 
he qualified his use of the term technical change by applying it "only to such 
changes which are brought about by a deliberate decision to reduce costs" 2/ 
(our imderlining). This led him to see, behind every effort to increase output, 
the intention of reducing production costs. He did not, therefore, discuss the 
rather straightforvjard point that efforts to increase output may be a prime 
changes which are "induced" by increases in output with ''autonomous" technical 
changes (in which category he presumably includes the direct and indirect 
technical changes mentioned previously). Autonomous technical changes are not 
induced by increases of output, though they may cause increased output through 
lowered prices. In the present context, it seems reasonable to leave out this 
third category of technical changes from our discussion, because whilst the 
essence of capacity- stretching is to squeeze more output from existing installed 
machines, units and plants, the main "output-increase induced" kinds of technical 
changes which Hollander has in mind involve replacing machines, or sets of 
facilities suitable at smaller scales of output by new machines or facilities 
suitable at higher scales of output. 
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objective in their own right, and may even be undertaken in circumstances when it 
is expected that production costs will increase as a result of working plants at 
higher output levels made possible through technical changes introduced- to stretch 
their capacity. Hence "capacity-stretching" changes of a cost-increasing kind do 
not appear in Hollander's scheme. 
To clarify matters, and see more clearly the relation between "the effect on 
capacity" and "the effect on costs" of given technical changes, we shall put 
forward the following hypothetical cases based on assuming the existence of plants 
which have the very simple (but not entirely unrealistic) cost behaviour shown 
below in Diagram 11.1 below. 
Diagram 11.1: Assumed Cost Behaviour in an Unstretched Plant 
COSTS 
MAX OUTPUT 
Quite simply, a.s ou"tpu"t is va-Pxedj vapiablG cosiis a,pe hePG a.ssuined constHntr 
per unit of output until Q (the maximum feasible capacity of the plant) ia Illo-X 
reached, whereupon variable costs are then assumed - for simplicity of exposition -
to rise abruptly (become infinite). This explains the behaviour of the AVC 
(average variable costs) curve shown in the diagram. 
The behaviour of average fixed costs, AFC, and average total costs, ATC, is 
also shown in the diagram. 
Let us suppose that a "capacity stretching" technical change is now introduced. 
What will its effect be on costs? 
So far as average fixed costs are concerned it will have n£ effect in altering 
the AFC curve shown in Diagram 11.1 - because for the momento we shall ignore 
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the fixed costs involved in stretching (though we will bring them back into the 
discussion later). 
As for its effects on average variable costs, we shall make three hipotheses; 
1. That the capacity stretching technical change leaves average variable 
costs the same as in the "unstretched" plant. 
2. That the capacity stretching technical change raises average variable 
costs above what they were in the "unstretched" plant. 
3. That the capacity stretching technical change lowers average variable 
costs below what they were in the unstretched plant. 
The next step will be to depict each of these three hypotheses in diagrams. 
First, hypothesis 1. This is shown in Diagram 11.2 below, where the 




As can be seen, the effect of a "hypothesis 1" technical change is simply 
to permit the ATC curve of the plant to go on extending downwards towards the 
Ave asymptote in the zone beyond ^MAX which was the maximum output producible 
in the unstretched plant. It does this, as shown, until reaching Q^^, the s 
limit capacity of the stretched plant. 
Furthermore it can be seen how this case is precisely Hollander's "indirect" 
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cost reducing technical change. So long as the output of the stretched plant 
is greater than MAX and less than MAX then this kind of technical change 
is always cost reducing. At outputs MAX it is cost "neutral" as costs are 
u 
identical to what they would have been in the unstretched plant. 




MAX MAX OUTPUT 
As shown, the effect of a "hypothesis 2" technical change is to raise average 
variable costs to AVC^, but to permit the plant to produce at finite costs ATC^ 
in the region between „MAX and „MAX where ATC would have been "infinite". Q Q u u s^ 
Notice however that this kind of capacity stretching technical change is always 
cost-incresing compared to what average total costs were at output .^MAX in the 
unstretched plant. ^u 
Hypothesis 3 is shown in Diagram 11.4 in the next page, and is simply 




Q^^ OUTPUT s 
It can be seen how - for all levels of output less than gMAX - this third 
s 
kind of capacity stretching technical change is always cost-reducing, compared 
to costs at similar output levels in the unstretched plant. 
In effect the, the above three diagrams suggest that Hollander's "indirect" 
cost-reducing technical change can be viewed just as a special case of the broader 
class of "capacity-stretching" technical changes. 
For the simplified kind of cost behaviour shown in the diagrams, the 
defining condition of a capacity stretching technical change is that it permits 
a stretched plant to produce - at "finite" costs - in a range of outputs which 
lies just beyond the "limit" output of the unstretched plan (where, in the 
unstretched plant, costs would by assumption be infinite). 
Now, relax the assumption about a rigid "limit" capacity in unstretched 
plants, and we can still have a straightforward definition of a capacity stretching 
technical change: We simply replace MAX by a "reference output" Q-^ Then we 
^u 
can say that what defines a capacity-stretching technical change is that it reduces 
the marginal costs of obtaining additional output AQ beyond Q* as compared 
to what these marginal variable costs would be if this additional output Q 
was obtained by adding variable factors to the unstretched plant. 
Note that this does not necessarily mean, as our "hypothesis 2" case 
suggested, that ATC for producing output Q-«+ Q will be less than ATC for u 
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producing output Q*. Whether this will be so, or not, depends on whether capacity 
stretching increases or decreases average variable costs in the plant - and also on 
whether or not any incrase in this latter costs is offset by the fall in average 
fixed costs that will result from producing a gretater volume of output in the 
stretched plant. 
Until now, we have abstracted from the fixed costs of stretching, but it is 
obviously important to consider them. 
To see the significance of the fixed-cost element in capacity stretching, it 
is helpful to make a distinction between "successful" capacity stretching and 
"profitable" capacity stretching. The former saves on variable costs, as coii5)ared 
to adding variable factors to the unstretched plant, when expanding output. The 
latter implies that the discounted savings obtained more than compensate for the 
fixed costs of stretching. 
If a capacity stretching innovation is average variable cost reducing at a 
given output level Q* compared to average variable costs at this same output 
level Q* in the imstretched plant then a demand increase may not be a necessary 
condition for a capacity-stretching innovation. However, if stretching innovations 
increase average variable costs at output Q* then a demand increase ^ a 
necessary condition. Moreover, if fixed costs of stretching are high, capacity-
stretching, though "successf\il", may only be profitable under sharp (and sustained) 
increases in demand. 
We should also distinguish a profitable stretching from the "optimum" 
stretching given new demand conditions. The latter would maximise the profits 
from stretching. Presumably the sharper the increase in demand, the greater the 
stretching which would maximise profits. 
One further point worth noting is that, throughout the above discussion, we 
have been asking whether capacity stretching innovations were, or were not, cost 
reducing compeired to costs in an unstretched plant. However one can also ask -
are stretching innovations cost reducing compared to costs in a new plant, or in 
a plant whose capacity is expanded by major investments, not by stretching? We 
shall not explore this here, however some aspects of this question are tackled 
in Section 12 below. 
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12. A MODEL FOR CHOOSING BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL EXPANSION AND 
CAPACITY STRETCHING 
In section 10 we described a situation where both capacity stretching 
and conventional expansion may take place3 but at different time periods: the 
former in the medium run while the latter in the long run. If we introduce 
capital indivisibilities into the above analysis it is likely that capacity 
stretching may be optimum in the long run alsoj at least for small increases 
in demand. Whatever the relationship between the two means of output expansion 
in the long run, it is clear that the conventional expansion decision - its magnitude 
and timing - is affected by the possibilities of capacity stretching available to 
the firm. A full blown model should be able to analyse the optimum combination 
of the two both in the medium and long-terms. In what follows we present a simple 
model which only considers a once and for all decision of one or the other means 
of output expansion when the firm is confronted with a temporary increase in 
demand. In contrast to the previous section where both means of output expansion 
were complementary, the following model will assume that they are substitutes, 
i.e., that within the relevant period, either capacity stretching or convenional 
expansion will be optimum. Although we are aware of the restrictive nature of 
the excercise we do believe it may represent a useful first step towards k more 
comprehensive model of the behaviour of firms viz-a-viz cacpacity stretching and 
conventional expansion. 
12.1 Assxjmptions 
Following Teubal we assume a monopolist facing an increase in demand 
during T years who makes a decision to adjust by one of two means: capacity-
stretching or the addition of new conventional capacity (capital intensive 
investment). Capital is the only factor of production, and it is assumed to be 
at the level which maximizes profits at t=0 (the time when the temporary shift 
in demand occurs and where the expansion decision is taken). It is perfectly 
sensible and a constant cost of capital r and productivity of capital a, both 
prior to and after t=0, is assumed. Finally we assume a constant elasticity 
of demand n>i„ The basic set of equations are the following: 
q'^  = b^ P'"^ (1) 
Q® = aK 
where are quantities demanded and supplied respectively and b is the 
demand level parameter at t=o. From (1) 
p = <IF> 
which when introduced into profit function 
i'^ o = Q(p-c) 
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(where c is unit cost of production = — ) 
leads to the following condition defining K^ - the initial, profit maximizing 
profit maximizing capital stock: 
£ 
a (1 -i) ) ako^ (2) 
The LHS of (2) is marginal cost while the RHS is marginal revenue. 
From (2) we set 
( 2 ' ) 
At t=o, the demand level parameter b rises to b., for T years 
Ubo, y>l 
where y is the demand shift parameter. Let, H (9; r) and TI^  (R;r) represent 
cumulated undiscounted profits between 9 and T " from conventional expansion and 
capacity stretching respectively. 9 is the adjustment delay (starting from t=o) 
for a new plant of magnitude AKo to reach normal capacity a(AKo) a/. This 
would be the period of time beyond t=o which would still be required to carry out 
all the activities related to capital investment: specification of equipment, 
selection of suppliers, delivery of equipment produced, installation of equipment 
and start-up. In this model we assume for simplicity that 9 is fixed and is 
exogenously determined (although it is clearly an endogenous variable in part) 
The main variable affecting 11 is R, the expenditures on capital stretching. 
The productivity of the capital stretching activity can be represented by a function 
X(R) ; X' > o X" < X(o) (3) 
where a.X(R) is the output-capital ratio of 'stretched' equipment. 
9 here is the adjustment lag for adding conventional capacity rather 
than that for optimally adapting the structure of the firms total capital to a 
higher level of output. In this respect it relates more to a planning framework 
than to the long run adjustment framework described in section 10. 
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The specific expressions for 11^  and 112 are given by (U). a/ 
(4a) is maximum profits from capital investment, i.e., it implies that the 
capital stock has been optimally adjusted to the new level of demand (eq. (2) 
with bo, Ko substituted by b^ and (Ko+AKo) respectively). That is the 
reason why H^ (9jr) is expressed exclusively in terms of parameters of the 
model. W n^ (R;r) on the other hand depends on R, a variable whose level 
the firm must set in order to maximize the profits from capacity stretching. Let 
R" be the optimum level of R, that is the level which maximizes K^ (R;r) from 





{ UR^O } = 
J/^ T (5) 
= B(r) 
a/ The derivation makes use of (l)-(3). See Teubal op. cit. in reference 
1/ of this section. 
b/ Notice that (0;r) = ^ (2. HZÍ)^"!- > 
- 1 n r n 
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Notice that, bo ( ^  ^^ ^^  ) is the original "scale" of output or industry size, 
bo ( -— ) the original level of sales, and y > 1 the demand shift r n 
parameter. Clearly the greater the magnitude of the variables, the lower the 
L H S of (5) which implies -given X"(R)<ó (eq.(3))-. that the magnitude 
of R* is also greater. 
12.2 Desirability of capacity-stretching: 
This depends on comparing 11^  (9 ; r) of (M-a) with II^  (R" ; r) of 
(4-b) and (5). The condition 
n^ (R";r) > n^ (9;r) (6) 
can be expressed as follows 
E X(R-,0) 
{ A(RA)}^"ñ > A(e) + B(r) R (6') 
where 
ACQ) - - ^  9 (p+n) - (ry^ -^ "^  t 1) (7) 
and 
A(0) = ^ ^ > 1 = Ad) (8) 
ny 
Note that A'(9) < 0 
Condition (6') in conjunction with (5) can be represented in Diagram 12.1. 
In the vertical axis we measure both and X(R,9) (the LHS and RHS 
of (6')) and in the horizontal axis, R. Condition (5) is represented by the 
equality between the slopes of both of the schedules. shows that 
capacity when 9 = 0 . 
This follows from X, (R-'-)^ "^ '^ '^  > X (R-'>;o). 






to conventional expansion in the absence of a positive adjustment lag, the relevant 
capacity stretching schedules should avoid cutting the X(R,0) schedule for below 
(see the AzÍR)^ schedule of the f igures) . Thus a necessary condition for 
prefering capacity stretching is 0 > 0. a/ Under our assumptions, the 
possibility of capacity stretching being the preferred action positively depends 
on the following factors: 
i . The eficiency of capacity stretching. 
i i . The scale of output over which the stretching is applied - a magnitude 
which under our assumptions directly depends on the demand parameters 
b^ , y and n. 
i i i . The adjustment delay to conventional expansion, 9. 
iv. The period T for which the higher demand is expected. 
We also note the following: 
Proposition 1: 
Whenever capacity stretching is the preferred response to a temporary 
increase in demand the optimum expenditure increases with the efficiency of 
capacity stretching and with the level of output of the industry. 
Proposition 2: 
The minimum delay to conventional expansion above which capacity stretching 
is the preferred response to an upward shift in demand decreases when the magnitude 
of the demand shift increases. 
Proposition 1 follows directly from the Diagram. An upward increase in 
the original sales level of the industry b^ ^ ~ ^ in the demand shift 
parameter y or in the time horizon T wi l l reduce the slope of the X(R,9) 
scheduele and therefore tend to shift R" to the right. Similarly, an upward 
increase in n or in A.(R) wi l l increase the slope of the schedule 
and therefore also tend to increase R". 
With respecto to Proposition 2 note that the minimum delay 9_ for a 
capacity stretching schedule XzCR) is given by the following 
a/ One might s t i l l argue that when capital investment is indivisible capacity 
stretching may be preferred even when 0 = 0 (especially when demand shifts are 




^ _ X(Rí« ; 0) - X (RíO^"^^^ 9 ~ 2 2 
X(R* 0) - X (R''> ; 1) 
2 2 
= A'B' 
( 9 ) 
AB 
see Diagram 12.1 
In order to show that a greater demand shift u reduces e_ differentiate 
the intercept and slope of the X(R,0) schedules with respect to y { see (5 ) , 
(8 ) } -
i . e . the slope declines and the intercept increases. This means that the 
numerator of (9) decreases and the denominator increases, i . e . , 0 declines. 
An extreme situation is described in Diagram 12.2. The pair of parallel 
lines represent the X(R,0) and X(R,1) schedules for two values of y>l: jJo 
(the fu l l l ines ) ; Ui>Uo (the broken l ines) . We observe -as the demand shift 
parameter increases from yo to yi how the mininimum delay, 9, declines from 
aB' ^ 
This result is not surprising since we assumed that the costs of capacity 
stretching are constant whatever the scale of output (alternatively, there are 
increasing returns to capacity stretching) while the costs of conventional 
expansion are proportional to the magnitude of the expansion sought (constant 
returns). The conclusion however wi l l also hold along a range of demand shift 
in the more real ist ic situation characterized both by increasing returns to 
scale in conventional expansion and capital indivis ibi l i t ies . Strong shifts 
in demand wi l l then be required to reverse the conclusion reached here. 
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1. This paper has had two main aimso First to advance in the empirical 
description of "capacity stretching" in steel plants= Second to contribute some 
ideas towards the conceptual and theoretical articulation of "capacity stretching" 
technical change. 
2. These aims arose from observing that though capacity stretching seems 
to be quite "pervasive" and important at the plant levels i t has not received 
mucha specific attention in the economic literature; not that i t has gone 
entirely unrecognised, but it has usually been relegated to secondary status in 
discussions of other topics which are considered as central - e.g» cost-reducing 
technical change, or economies of scale= 
3. Empirically, several findings based on detailed case-studies of some 
Latin American steel plants were reported. The main group of findings included 
( i ) the large cumulative extent of capacity-stretching achieved in several main 
stages of these plants, ( i i ) the fact that this stretching has been achieve in 
piecemeal, incremental fashion over a period of years often at very low 
investment cost, ( i i i ) that technical change projects with a capacity-stretching 
impact were pervasive in a l l the plants, and ( i v ) that stretched capacity was 
often the primary, not merely a subsidiary objective in many of these projects. 
It was also reported that powerful incentives to capacity-stretching 
in three of the plants had derived from the delaying or blocking over several 
years of the "conventional" ( i . e . capital intensive) expansion plaiis which the 
management of a l l these plants had preferred as their f i r s t option in expanding 
output. 
5. Many other incentives to capacity stretching were discovered in these 
steelplant case-studies. These included indivis ibi l i t ies in steelplant equipment, 
bottleneck/imbalance inducements, temporary demand peaks, learning-by-doing with 
existing equipment, the external stimulus from capacity-stretching innovations 
developed in other plants. 
6. At the engineering level, a "generic" set of techniques (heuristics) 
for stretching the capacity of steelplant units and stages was identifies, - and 
given that engineers as performance-improvers are trained to apply heuristics of 
these and similar kinds, i t was concluded that the pervasiveness of capacity 
stretching technical change in these plants was natural in engineering terms. 
7. Both "ad-hoc" and systematic approaches were observed in the plants 
towards exploiting the capacity-stretching potential of the installations. In 
general a more systematic approach got adopted over time as the plant technical 
staff developed both familiarity with, and a more scientific understanding of 
the processes concerned. In at least two of the plants, capacity stretching 
potential was greatly underestimated. It was only the fact that blocked or 
delayed conventional expansion had made capacity stretching repeatedly necessary 
that led these plants to actually discover and make use of the f u l l stretching 
potential that was there. 
8. Turning to conceptual and theoretical articulation, i t was shown how 
four inherent technlogical features of steel plants (viz. large capital requirements, 
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great complexity of processj multistage sequential nature of process and 
indiv is ib i l i t ies ) a l l reinforce each other in leading to multiple incentives 
to capacity stretching technical changes. Hence capacity stretching is likely 
to be a common occurence in a l l steelplants serving growing markets. 
9. It was suggested how the incorporation of capacity stretching technical 
change into the long run adjustment process of a monopolist might be frame by 
considering capacity stretching as a "medium run" adjustment. Full adjustment 
of existing plant Cor building of new or additional plant) to satisfy a new 
long-run equilibrium sitviation takes a substantial time, due to various longish 
timelags involved in extensively rebuilding or building new plant. In contrast 
the stretching.of existing plant takes much less time and may therefore represent 
a rational response in the medium run. It was suggested that in the adjustment 
process to a higher demand both capacity stretching and conventional expansion 
are complementary, each one taking place in a different term. 
10. Also explored was the question of how capacity-stretching technical 
changes compare and relate to the better known category of cost-reducing ones. 
It was shown that capacity stretching technical changes require broader definitions 
than those proposed for cost-reducing changes by Hollander, and also that capacity-
stretching technical changes cannot be considered as "cost-reducing" in a global 
sense. Nevertheless, i f fixed costs of stretching are l e f t out of account then 
the marginal costs of additional output (beyond a specified level ) in a "stretched" 
plant should be lower than what these marginal cost would have been in the 
unstretched" plant. In this strictly defined sense, a l l capacity stretching 
changes must be cost-reducing. 
11. A distinction was suggested between "successful" capacity stretching, 
(which fu l fu l l s the condition just mentioned in the previous paragraph of reducing 
the marginal costs of additional output f^ -ompared to In an unstretched plant), and 
"profitable" capacity stretching in which the discounted profits from stretching 
more than compensate for the fixed costs of stretching. One can also visualise 
a further category, "optimal" capacity—stretching which refers to the optimum 
extent and expenditure on stretching which would be incurred so as to makimise 
the profits a plant can obtain from a given demand increase. 
12. A simple formal model of choice between capacity stretching or conventional 
expansion in the context of a temporary rise in demand was put forth in the last 
section of the paper. In this model these two alternatives are considered as 
siibstitutes. For simplicity, conventional expansion was assumed to take place 
at constant cost with an exogenously determined adjustment timelag 0 > 0. The 
notion of a minimum adjustment timelag £ - one which assumes that both 
alternatives are equally profitable - was put forth. It was shown to depend 
inversely on the magnitude of the demand shift . Also shown was that, provided 
0 > 9_ the optimal investment in capacity stretching was positively affected 
the scale of the industry, the magnitude of the demand shift and its duration. 
13. It should be obvious that many complications have been le f t out in the 
models put forward in this paper. For instance, the output of a stretched steel 
plant may not be fu l ly homogeneous with the output of a newer plant based on a 
different technological process. Also our modelling has assumed perfect information 
about capacity stretching possibi l i t ies , whereas empirically the evidence is that 
these may.be underestimated; in fact stretching seems to occur in a sequential 
"groping" process whereby experience gained at each step of stretching breeds 
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confidence for the next one. Then again5 the fact that the timelag for conventional 
expansion i s , in real ity, partly an endogenous variable, would need to be taken 
into account explicitly in a more sophisticated model» Also attention definitely 
needs paying to the individisi l ity aspects in conventional expansion, which we 
have mentioned but no dealt with here. Another aspect not touched on in o\ir paper 
relates to the function of "stretchable" plant capacity in oligopolistic market 
structure, where idle or stretchable capacity may be conceived of in entry-preventing 
terms» 
14. Nevertheless even at this stage of development, the findings reported 
in this paper can be seen to be of some consequence to planning. For they cast 
doubt on the relevance of two major assumptions made by Chenery, Manne, and many 
others in the planning literature: f i r s t , that production capacity is well defined, 
and second that adjustment lags are instantaneous. In the previous three sections, 
we put forth some considerations and simple models which attempt to explain or 
incorporate these findings. A measure of their success wi l l be in the stimulus 
they may provide to other researchers in further conceptualizing and modelling 
the central phenomenon dealt with in this paper. 
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